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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to examine the economic factors motivating Australian 
listed lessee firms to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their finance lease 
commitments from 1985 to 1987 as permitted by the transitional provision of AAS 17. 
Six research hypotheses are developed from the economic consequences perspective. It is 
hypothesised that the decision to capitalize finance lease commitments is positively 
related to firm's: (I) corporate structure. (2) size, (3) political visibility. (4) financial 
performance, and (5) overseas association. and negatively related to (6} debt contract 
financial constraints. Support for these hypotheses would be construed as suggesting 
that capitalization is a means for lessee firms to reduce or mitigate agency and/or 
political costs and concurrently as a signal to the market that they are high quality 
firms. A pooled multivariate cross-sectional analysis for 1985 to 1987 was performed 
incorporating sensitivity analysis to determine the Mbest" logistic regression model. This 
model was then assessed to determine its validity and predictive efficacy. Tak�n as a 
whole, i.e .. from 1985 to 1987. the sample consists of 314 Jessee firms selected from the 
Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) Annual Report File: 67 firms in the 
capitalizer group and 314 flrr.,s in the non-capitalizer group. The results provide 
consistent evidence that less�e firms adopted the rapitalization as a response to Ll-ie 
perception by the media as being politically visible firms and concurrently as a signal to 
the market that they are high quality firms. Even though the "best" model is significant. 
valid in terms of generalisable beyond the sample, and efficacious in their predictive 
accuracy, it exhibits only modest explanatory power. The evidence of this stu�y also 
questions the usefulness of a lengthy transitional period. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the economic factors motivating Australian listed lessee 
companies to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their finance lease I 
commitments during the period 1985 to 1987. as permitted by the transitional provtslon 
of accounting standard AAS 17: Accounting for Leases (Australian Accounting Research 
Foundation [MRFJ, Accounting Standards Board [ASBI, 1984). 
Background of the study 
The measurement and disclosure aspects of leases. especially finance leases, were 
vexing and conter.tious issues in Australia (Roberts. 1980: Whitt.red & Zimmer. 1992). 
Even though the provisions of AAS 17 became mandatory on or after I January 1988, 
Morns & Carnegie ( 1988) and Morris ( 1990) reported that there were a number of listed 
lessee compantes which had adopted the standard during the phase-in period from 1985 
to 1987. This decision concerning the choice of the adoption date represents viable 
research opportunities. 
Wilkins and Mok (1991) analysed lessee firms' discretionary finance lease 
accounting policy choice (i.e .. either capitalization or footnote rlisclosure) during the first 
year (1985) of the phase-in period. In :summary. the univariate findings of their study 
indicate r.hat whilst leverage. interest coverage. increase in profits, and increase In 
interest coverage influence managements' choice of finance lease disclosure, profits, 
increase in leverage. size, industry, and audit firm do not appear to influence the 
Originally, AAS 17 defined a finance lease as �a lease which effectively transfers from 
the lessor to the lessee substantially all the risks and benefits tncident to the 
ownership of the leased property.· (para 5) However, the revised AAS 17 and also ASRB 
1008 (AARF, ASB, and Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB), 1987) defines a 
finance lease as any lease which is not an operating lease. Thus, a finance lease is a 
lease that effectively (tn the economic rather than legal sensr,) represents the purchase 
of an asset. 
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accounting policy choice, "managers make capitalization decisions aimed at maximising 
near term profits and minimising accounting measure of financial risk" (p, 177). In a 
later study, Wilkins and Mok (1993) conclude that "capitalization has a material and 
significant impact on Australian . . . firm financial statements and key financial 
performance indicators" (p. 58).2 
Slgnlftcance of the study 
A unique characteristic of MS 17 was that it had a transitional provision, 
which allowed firms to choose the implementation time between the standard'& 
operative date and its mandatory date. However, early compliance with the standard was 
encouraged. The implication of the transitional provision was it allowed firms to be: 
selective and it provided an opportunity for these firms to time compliance with the 
standard to their advantage. For example. for earnings management effects (including 
income smoothing}. 3 
Wilkins and Mok ( 1991) were the first to analyse the economic determinants 
motivating lessee firms to either capitalize their finance lease commitments or to disclose 
these commitments via footnote disclosure in the first year of the transitional period. 
This study attempts to extend and refine the study by Wilkins and Mok in two aspects. 
First, this study employs a combination of contracting theory and signalling theory 
approaches, to be discussed in Chapter 4. and consequently a different set of 
independent variables than those used by Wilkins and Mok. Second, it performs a 
2 
3 
These findings should be Interpreted with care. This is because It is not clear whether 
the effects (either positive or negative) on lessees' financial statements and key 
financial performance indicators are the result of capttall7..ation of finance lease 
commitments only. It ls plausible that other factors contributed to such changes. For 
example. there ts evidence to indicate that firms use a portfolio of accounting policies 
rather than single accounting policy in reporting their financial positions and 
performances (Zmijewski & Hagerman. 1981}. 
Earnings management refers to managers· decisions in changing or selecting 
accounting policies that would increase their compensation or reduce the probabWty of 
debt covenants violations. The objective of Income smoothing is to reduce eamtngs 
fluctuations (Pincus & Wasley. 1994: Watts & Zimmerman. 1990).
n 
pooled cross-sectional analysts of the characteristics for capitalizers and non­
capitalizers during the whole phase-in period (i.e., 1985 to 1987). These extensions are 
deliberated in Chapter 5. 
Objective of the study 
The main purpose of this study is to explain managements' decisions regarding 
finance lease accounting choices for the whole phase-in period ( 1985 to 1987). The 
result of a pooled analysis would provide evidence of any variation between the two 
groups of firms. i.e .. the capitalizers and footnote disclosers. throughout the transitional 
period. The findings of this study complement the findings of Wilkins and Mok (1991) 
and expand the accounting policy choices literature by providing another perspective, 
through contracting and signalling theory. to the understanding of managements' 
choices in finance lease accounting. 
Contrlbuilon of the study 
Besides providing an understanding of managements' motives in finance lease 
accounting policy choices. this study makes a contribution in two aspects. First. this 
study proposes that a better understanding of managements' accounting policy c.hoices 
C'an be achieved by explicitly including signalling theory into the economic consequences 
framework in developing the research hypotheses. A combined contracting-signalling 
theory of the economic consequences paradigm will better explain the phenomenon 
than a separate contracting theory or signalling theory analyses. Second, the findings of 
this study will also provide a preliminary view on the usefulness of a lengthy transitional 
(or phase-in) provision in an accounting standard. Whilst there is a cost/benefit 
argument supporting such provision (Langer & Lev. 1993), there is also a claim that a 
transitional provision provides firms with opportunity to indirectly manipulate their 
income (Pincus & Wasley, 1994). 
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Organlaatlon @f the study 
This thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter discusses the nature and 
prevailing situation of accounting for leases. Chapter 3 presents the re\.1ew of the related 
literature of this study. Specifically, it critically analyses previous similar studies as 
appeared in the literature. Cilapter 4 deliberates the theoretical framework and also the 
formulation of the relevant hypotheses of this study. Following this, Chapter 5 describes 
the research method, which includes a discussion on sample selection, definition of 
variables. data sources, and research design. Chapters 6 reports and deliberatef the 
results of the statistical analyses performed in this study. Chapter 7 is the final chapter 
of this thesis. It provides the summary and conclusions of this study. It also presents 
alternative plausibie hypotheses. limitations and implications of this study, and 
suggestions for future research. 
13 
CBAPTER2 
LESSEE'S ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the various aspects of lease accounting. First, an oveIView 
of the development of a lease accounting standard in Australia. Second, a descrtptlon of 
the main features of the Australian accounting standard AAS 17. Third, a summary of 
the debate on the accounting treatment of finance lease commitments, between 
capitalization or footnote disclosure. This discussion will be supported by empirical 
evidence where available. 
Development of tease accounting standard 
Accounting for leases has been a particularly contentious and vexing issue as 
reflected by the discussion it generated in the professional and academic Journals during 
the period from the late 1970's into the mid- l 980's (e.g .. AARF. 1979; Long, 1985; Reilly. 
1984: Roberts 1980; Roberts 1981; Wise & Wise, 1985; Woodhams. i985). An accounting 
standard on leases was considered relevant and appropriate because of the following 
reasons. First. leasing had grown in significance ln firms' capital structure over the years 
(Bazley, Brown & lzan 1985; Harris, 1983). Second, prior to 1985, there was a diversity of 
practices in the reporting of lease transactions in the annual reports of lessees and 
lessors (Harris, 1983; Stevenson, 1984). Third, the influence of overseas developments 
and implementation of leasing accounting standards - the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) issued IAS 1 7 in 1982; the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB - USA) issued SFAS No. 13 in 1976; the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA - Canada) issued s.3065 of CICA Handbook in 1978; and the 
14 
Accounting Standards Committee (A..� - UK) issued SSAP 21 in 1984.4 
The process of promulgating an accounting standard for lease commitments 
started in Australia when the profession. through the Australian Accounting Research
Foundation (AARF) initially releast:d a Discussion Paper No. 1 .. Accounting for Leases· in 
1979 (AARF, 1979). This was followed by Exposure Draft No. 17 in December 1980 
(AARF, 1980).5 In view of the responses and criticisms received on the exposure draft
(Roberts, 1982}. a revised discussion paper was released in April 1983 (MRF. 1983) .6 
AAS 17: Accounting for Leases (AARF. Accounting Standards Board (ASB), 1984) was 
finally issued in March 1984 and was re-issued in June 1987 following its approval by 
the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) as approved accounting standard ASRB 
1008: Accounting for Leases (ASRB, 1986) in August 1986. In all essential respects, the 
approved standard and AAS 17 are consistent (Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). 
Features of AAS 17 
As this study concer;1s the choice of accounting method for finance leases by 
lessees. there are three featmes of AAS 17 that are relevant for further discussion. They 
are: 
4 
5 
6 
For an oveiview of the comparability of the Australian leasing standard (AAS l 71 wtth 
those of the international community, see Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(1994). On an overall basis, MS l 7 is conslstt>nt with IAS 17, SFAS 13 and SSAP 21. 
However, SFAS 13 is considered to be more comprehensive than MS 17 (Ernst and 
Young. 1991). 
A total of 49 effective responses to the exposure draft were received. On the issues 
regarding the accounting treatment of finance lease commitments by lessees, 21 
respondents supported Mcapitalization only", while 12 respondents supported 
Mdisclosure only". In addltlon, many of the respondents who supported the optional 
approach of the EU specified that the capitalization alternative ought to become 
mandatory at the end of the proposed three-years trial period (Roberts, 1982). 
The principal change from the exposure draft concerns the treatment of finance leases 
by leasees. The exposure draft proposed an option for lessees to either capitalize 
finance leases or provide expanded disclosure of finance leases. This optional 
approach attracted criticism from respondents to the exposure draft. The Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) decided that, In view of support for capltalimtton expressed tn 
responses to the exposur� draft (Roberts, 1982), and the need for consistent and 
comparable treatment of finance leases by lessees, the option should be replaced With a 
capitalization requirement. 
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Clualflcatlou of leuea 
AAS 17 requires lessees and lessors to classify leases as finance or operating on 
the basis of economic substance. Where a ,ease effectively transfers substanttally all of 
the risks and benefits of ownership of the leased property from the lessor to the lessee, it
should be classified as a finance lease by both the lessee and the lessor (para. 24). Where 
substantially all of the risks and benefits of ownership effectively remain with the lessor, 
the lease should be classified as an operating lease by both the lessee and the lessor 
(para. 25). 7 
MS 17 provides guidelines to assist lessees and lessors in applying the basic 
concept of transference of risks and benefits of ownership. Classification as a finance 
lease by lessees and lessors normally would be expected where the following conditions 
are satisfied (para. l 0): 
7 
8 
(a) the lease is non-cancellable: and
[b) either of the following tests is met:
(i) the lea:.e term is for 75 per cent or more of the useful life of the leased
property; or
(ii) the present value, at the beginning of the lease term. of the minimum
lease payment is equal to or greater than 90 per cent of the fair value of
the leased property to the lessor at the inception of the lease. 8
See f1...otnote I for the revised definitions of finance and operating leases. 
Para 12 provides that where a lease contains a bargain purchase option, the amount of 
that option, by definition, forms part of the minimum lease payment. Furthermore, 
Appendix 1 of AAS 17 also provides that if ownership ls transferred by the end of lease 
term, then such lease should be classified as finance lease. 
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Critics commented that the gutdellnes are open to subjective interpretation and 
that this would also make its implementation and enforcement rather tenuous (Long, 
1985; Reilly, 1984: Wise & Wise, 1985: Woodhams, 1985). 
Accouatlng for flllance leuea by leueea 
The alternative methods of accounting for finance leases by lessees are: 
(a} capitalize the lease, i.e., record the lease as the acquisition of an asset 
and the incurrence of a Uabillty; or 
(b) do not capitalize the lease, i.e., account for each minimum lease payment
as an expense in the period in which it is incurred.
The economic substance of a finance lease is that the lessee acquires a right to 
the economic benefits from the use of the leased property for the major part of its useful 
Ufe. In return, the lessee enters into an obligation to pay for that right an amount which 
approximates the fair value of the leased property and the related finance charges. AAS 
17 adopts the View that if transactions involving finance leases were not reflected in the 
lessee's balance sheet. the economic resources and the level of obligation of an entity 
would be understated. Thus. MS 17 requires that finance leases be recorded by lessees 
as an asset and as an obligation to pay future rentals. i.e .. the capitalization of finance 
leases. 
Transitional provision for lessees 
AAS 17 permitted lessees, from the operative date of the standard, i.e., 31 March 
1985, and for accounting periods ending on or before 31 December 1987, to adopt a 
policy of capitalizing all finance leases or to adopt a policy of treating all minimum lease 
payments as periodf expenses (para. 60). However, during the transitional (or phase-in) 
period, detailed disclosures were required in respect of non-capitalized finance leases so 
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as to provide sufficient Information to permit financial statement users to appreciate the 
effect on the balance sheet if finance leases had been capitaUzed. 
Two reasons were considered to have influenced the provision of the extended 
transitional period (Stevenson, 1984: Whlttred & Zimmer, 1992) in AAS 17.9 First, to 
provide preparers and users with the opportunity to gain experience 1n presenting and 
interpreting information relating to leo:ses. Second, the possible adverse impact 1n terms 
of violations of trust deeds brought about by capitalization of finance leases by lessees. 
The transitional period would allow affected firms to overcome any such problems, for 
example by re-negotiating the trust deeds. 
These reasons argue that capitalization of finance leases by lessees could have 
economic consequences. The folloWing section discusses the capitalization debate in 
depth supported by empirical eVidence from the literature where available. 
capitalization debate and emplrlcal evidence 
There are basically three arguments advocated by the proponents supporting the 
capitalization of finance leases. First. capitalization wnuld better reflect the economic 
substance of lessees (Harris, 1983; McGregor 1985; Woodhams. 1985). This is achieved 
through: (1) the recognition of a finance lease as a component of total assets employed 
and finance lease commitments as component of total liabilities incurred by the lessees 
{McGregor, 1985); and (2) the quantification of leasing exposure of lessees (Munter & 
Ratcliffe, 1983; Wise & Wise, 1985). As further support, evidence from the literature 
indicates that leases and debts are substitutes in firm's capital structure (Marston & 
Hams. 1988). 
9 Other accounting standards that have an extended phase-In period are: AAS 25 
Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans: AAS 26 Financial Reporting .of General 
Insurance Activities; AAS 27 Financial Reporting by Local Governments; AAS 29
Financial· Reporting by Government Departments: and AAS 30 Accounting for EmployeeEntitlements. 
Following from the first argument, proponents of c.4p1tallzation stress that 
capitalization wor.l)d aid users 1n their economic decision making because lessees have 
less alternative methods for accounting and reporting lease transactions (Harris, 1983). 
At the same time, lessees' financial statements would be more comparable between 
lessees and with other firm& chat used non-lec�slng debt to finance their assets (Harris, 
1983; Munter & Ratcliffe, 1983). 
The third and final main argument supporting capitalization is that the other 
alternative of footnote disclosure of finance lease transactions is inadequate from users' 
perspectives. This argument ls corroborated by the assertions that footnote disclosure 
distorts financial ratios of lessees. Evidence indicates that key financial ratios measuring 
firms' leverage, profitability and liquidity would be over- or under-stated by keeping 
finance lease transactions off-balance sheet when, in fact, they should be properly 
reflected in the balance sheet (Abdel-khalik, Berk & Snowball. 1981b; El-Gazaar, 1993; 
Imhoff, Lipe & Wright. 1993: Ro. 1978: Wilkins & Zimmer. 1983a). Another claim of the 
inadequacy of footnote disclosure is that non-capitalization would allow manipulation 
of reported figures to the benefit of lessees and to the disadvantage of users of published 
financial statements (Wise & Wise. 1985). 
At the other extreme of the debate. proponents for footnote disclosure of finance 
leases rather than capitalization had presented credible arguments supporting their 
stance. First, capitalization of finance leases would go against the legal principle of 
ownership of assets (Harris, 1983; Long, 1985; McGregor, 1985; Wise & Wise, 1985). They 
maintain that only assets that are legally owned should be recognised in firms' financial 
statements and finance leases are not assets legally owned by lessees. I O Furthermore, 
the proponents of footnote disclosure argue that this method would also render lessees' 
10 However, this argument seems irrelevant as financial statements are a communtcatlon 
device for reporting economic reality affecting firms and In essence, finance lease is a 
financing method for lessees to use the leased assets over most of their useful lives 
(McGregor, 1985). 
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financial statements comparable across ftnns and adequately disclose lessees• finance 
lease exposures (Harris. 1983). Moreover. there ls ample evtde1u:e in the literature to 
indicate that footnote disclosure ls adequate for users' decision making (Abdel-khallk. 
Ajinknya & McKeown. 1981a; Bowman, 1980; Finnerty. Fitzsimmons & Oliver. 1980; 
Houghton, 1984; Lawrence & Bear, 1986; Murray, 1982, Wilkins & Z.tmmer, 1983a). This 
argument is further supported by the lack of evidence of a markec re ...... �i,m to the 
announcement of lease capitalization due to the availability of the information 
concerning lease commitments in the notes of the financial statements (Martin, 
Anderson & Keown. 1979). 
Another argument against capitalization of finance leases is the possible 
de1etertous effects of capitalization on commonly used accounting ratios and likely effect 
of this on debt restrictions under trust deeds (Campbell. 199 l: Harris, 1983: Stevenson, 
1985; Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). l l The thrust for this argument is that capitalization of 
finance leases would be costly in terms of renegotiation and/or default costs for lessees. 
Moreover, it is argued that leasing is a product brought by the demand from small and 
medium sized firms to specifically keep leasing off-balance sheet (Wise & Wise, 1985). 
The third argument against capitalizing finance leases is the direct and indirect 
costs, other than those highlighted in the preceding paragraph. associated with the 
requirements of AAS 17. First, the additional bookkeeping and auditing costs because of 
the differences between accounting and tax treatment of leases (Long, 1985). The second 
argument relates to other costs to redraft lease agreements to avoid being construed as 
finance leases (Abdel-khalik, 1981: Imhoff & Thomas, 1988: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992). 
l I Whilst this effect is true. tt is also an argument supporting the move to make certain 
leases, le.. finance lease, to be on-balance sheet to properly reflect the economic 
substance of lessees. Nevertheless, the inclusion of transitional provtston In AAS 17 
was to remedy this possible adverse effect on lessees (McGregor, 1985: Whtttred & 
Zimmer, 1992). 
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S1111l1Dary 
11-Js chapter discussed at some length the history and nature of the accounting 
and reporting of finance lease transactions in Australia. This was followed by a 
discussion on the debate whether or not finance leases should be capitalized or 
disclosed in the footnotes of lessees' published financial statements. This discussion is 
supported with empirical evidence where available. The inference that can be drawn is 
that capitalization of finance leases is consistent with the objective of reporting the 
economic reality of a firm. Furthermore. the discussion demonstrates that capitalization 
of finance leases has economic consequences because it affects users' economic decision 
making process which used the accounting numbers that are altered by capitalization. 
In the next chapter. a review of selected similar studies is presented, which will 
subsequently aid in the development of a theoretical framework and hypotheses 
formulation of this study. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTERS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines the motivations for firms to voluntarily adopt early the 
provisions of specific accounting standards during the transitional (or phase-in) period 
as allowed in these standards. Generally. the decision to either adopt early or defer 
adoption of the requirements of an accounting standard can be construed as a decision 
to choose between income increasing or income decreasing accounting policy. This 
decision also has balance sheet tmplicat!ons: affecting firm's liquidity ratios and 
financial and stabiUty ratios. This chapter is dedicated to the critical evaluation of the 
(1) theoretical frameworks. (2) hypotheses, and (3) methodologies employed in selected
published studies similar to this study. The selected studies that are reviewed in this 
chapter are summarised and tabulated in Table I . The objective of this literature review 
is to identify any refinements and improvements in the three preceding aspects that 
could be incorporated into this study. 
Accounting policy choice studies 
In 1975, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of 
Finwicial Accounting Standards {SFAS) No. 8 "Accounting for the Translatton of Foreign 
Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements". Due to the adverse 
reaction to SFAS No. 8. the FASB issued SFAS No, 52 "Foreign Currency Translation" in 
December 1981. Under the new rules, the translation adjustments of many foreign 
entities are made directly to shareholders' funds on the balance sheet instead of being 
included in net income. Generally. SFAS 52 requirement is an income increasing 
accounting policy, where firms switched from SFAS 8 to SFAS 52 (Ayres. 1986). SFAS 52 
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Table 1 
Accountlnl Polley Choice studies (Adoption Purine Phase-in Period) 
Autllon (Year) Accounting Std
Benjamin. Grossman SFAS52 Foreign currency 
and Wtggtns (1986) translation 
Senteney and SFAS 87 Pension 
Strawser ( 1990) Accounting 
Wilk.ins and Mok AAS 17 Accounting for 
(1991) Leases 
Samf and Welsh SFAS 87 Pension 
(1992) Accounting 
Objective 
To examine the impact of the adoption of 
SFAS 52 during the optional three-year 
adoption period (1981 - 1983). 
To determine whether managements' 
decisions to adopt SFAS 87 prior to 
mandatory date Is Influenced by its 
financial statement effects. 
To detennine the economic factors 
motivating management choice of lease 
capitalization or footnote disclosure only 
PriDcljil fl»dtna• 
Results suggest that early adoptton of SFAS 
52 for many firms was mottvated by a 
favourable impact on the financial 
statements {I.e., income and EPS). 
Evidence indicates that the timing of 
managements' adoption of SFAS may be 
influenced by its financial statement effects. 
Results Indicate that management chose 
financial lease Ccapttallzation tn 1985 With 
the View of maxilnlslng near term profits and 
accounting method during the first year of m1nim1sing accounting measures of 
phase-In period (I.e., 1985). financial risk. 
To investigate whether management's Early adopters were more frequently subject 
voluntary choice to adopt the provtsions to accounting-based debt constraints: 
of SFAS 87 earlier than required is related to stzc, funding status. and 
associated with factors Influencing ownership control. 
man�er's economic incentives. 
also containS a provision which allowed firms to adopt its requirement early during the 
three-year phase-in period from 1981 to 1983. 
Against the preceding background, Benjamin, Grossman and Wiggins (1986) 
examined the financial impact of the adoption of SFAS 52 during the phase-in period. 
There are lb:1itattons 1n this study. Benjamin et al. offered no theoretical foundation or 
propositions ,.m why firms changed from SFAS 8 to SFAS �:.'- or why firms adopted the 
rules of SFAS 52 in each year. Furthermore, no compartsc;n was made to any Mcontrol" 
group of firms, i.e., firms that did not change or adopt SFAS 52 in the phase-in period. 
The implication of these limitations is that this study is descriptive rather than a 
positive accounting theory study. Economic consequences literature suggests that 
voluntary or early adoption of new accounting standards are influenced by not only the 
associated financial effects but also by agency and political variables (e.g .. see Ayres 
(1986), Sarni and Welsh (1992) and Scott (1991). 
Apart from SFAS 52. the FASB had issued another accounting pronouncement 
which allowed firms to choose the compliance date between the standard's operative 
date and its mandatory date. This standard. SFAS 87 "Employers· Accounting for 
Pensions". was issued and became operative in December 1985. However, firms had two 
calender years before it became mandatory. Although there was widesrread opposition 
to SFAS 87. a number of firms adopted the standard earlier than required (Sarni & 
Welsh. 1992). Early adoption could be attributed to the hypothesised favourable balance 
sheet and income statements effects of adoption of SFAS 87 (Ali & Kumar. 1994). 
Senteney and Strawser (1990) employed an approach which was an improvement 
on the approach used by Benjamin et al. (1986). In attempting to determine whether 
management's decision to adopt SFAS 87 prior to the mandatory date was influenced by 
financial statements effects, they tested the firm's leverage and size as possiblr 
explanatory factors. In addition, they employed a between group experimental design 
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whereby their sample was divided into a treabnent group (i.e., firms adopted early) and a 
control group (i.e., firms that did not adopt early). This design IB a better design in terms 
of internal validity than the single group design employed by Benjamin et al. (1986).12
Senteney and Strawser ( 1990) inferred from their evtdence that the timing of 
management's adoption of SFAS 87 might be influenced by tts financial statements 
effects. This was an inconclusive inference because only one of three financial 
statements variables tested in their study was significant. However. they offered no 
suggestions as to what could be the possible underlying motive for management to 
adopt SFAS 87 during the transitional period. This query remains further unanswered 
because both of the other finn specific characteristics. i.e .. firm size and leverage, were 
not statistically significant. Moreover. the result of the size variable was contrary to the 
political cost hypothesis; it was positively associated with adoption of SFAS 87 - an 
income increasing accounting policy. 
There are other limitations of the study by Senteney and Strawser ( 1990). They 
failed to test for any differences in the characteristics of firms that adopted and did not 
adopt SFAS 87 in the first and third year of the phase-in period. They only tested for 
differences between the groups sampled In 1986. i.e .. the second year of the phase-in 
period. No explanation was offered for this approach taken. With regard to the statistical 
tests employed, they did not offer any reason(s) for performing both univariate and 
multivariate tests. In addition, prior to performing the multivariate analysis. there was 
no indication of testing for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The 
presence of harmful multicollinearity could cause the results of the multivariate 
regression to be unstable (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980; Fox, 1991). 
12 Sekaran (1992) asserts that a single treatment group design, as used by Benjamin et al. 
(1986), has "no scientific value in determining cause-effect relationships.· (p.136). 
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Sami and Welsh (1992) extended the earlier study by Senteney and Strawser 
(1990) by incorporating a number of Improvements in certain areas.13 First, Sami and 
Welsh provided a strong theoretical framework in developing ntne testable hypotheses, 
includJng several hypotheses that were not tested in the earlier two studies. This 
theoretical framework was based on the agency and political cost literature, which has 
been established and well tested in previous other accounting policy choice studies. A 
major Improvement was that. rather than relying on accounting ratio proxies, they used 
actual provisions of debt contracts in developing their debt constraints variabl•!S. 
Even though Sarni and Welsh (1992) was a significant improvement over the two 
earlier studies, certain aspects of their study should be noted as limitations. First, their 
sample consisted of firms in 1985 and 1986, which were grouped as adopters and non­
adopters. They left out firms that adopted or did not a�r,pt SFAS 87 in the final year of 
the phase-in period of 1987. No explanation was offered for the approach taken. Second, 
the sample of firms were match Pd according to their industry classifications. Accordingly. 
subsequent statistical tests were. matched-pairs tests. controlling for possible industry 
effects. However. if industry matched-pairs testing design was considered appropriate as 
purported by the authors. why not match the sample for other potentially significant 
factors including firm age, size. and capital structure. 
Notwithstanding the limitations. many of the improvements incorporated by 
Sarni and Welsh (1992) could also be incorporated in this study. For example, certain 
variables employed by Sarni and Welsh could also be used and testP.d tn the Australian 
environment; second. a pooled cross-sectional test of the sample as performed by Sarni 
and Welsh could be made. This method aims to validate the findings of separate cross­
sectional testing over the whole phase-in period. 
13 A major difference between these studies Is their objective. While Senteney and 
Strawser (1990) hypothesised that the financial statement effects of SFAS 87 influenced 
management's decision to adopt/not adopt, Sarni and Welsh (1992} hypothesised that 
the decision was influenced by managers' economic incentives. 
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The study by Wilkins and Mok (1991) is of great interest and relevance to this 
study. The current study is an extension and refinement, attempting to overcome the 
limitations identified in the preceding three studies and also the limitations in Wilkins 
and Mok. 
A major limitation identified in Wilkins and Mok (1991) ts that a majority of their 
hypotheses were developed based on the preliminary evidence derived from the reporting 
sample of their study. They found that capitalization of fmance lease commitments of 
the sampled listed lessee firms generally resulted in an increase in income from the 
capitalization. This is contrary to the expectation suggested by the literature that 
capitalization of finance leases would generally be an income decreasing policy. at least 
in the year of adoption. Le .. the first year of capitalization (Abdel-khalik. 1981; Ashton. 
1985; El-Gazaar. Lilien & Pastena. 1986; Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).14 The reliance on 
this preliminary evidence contributed to the development of hypotheses that were 
contradictory from the contracting theory perspective. For example. based on the general 
expectation that capitalization of finance lease is an accounting policy with negative 
effects on the balance sheet and Income statement. contracting literature predicts that 
low-leveraged firms and firms with high inten ·t coverage ratios would more likely 
capitalize their finance lease commitments; however. Wilkins and Mok hypothesised 
that low-leveraged firms and firms with lower interest coverage ratios would be more 
inclined to capitalize their finance lease commitments. 
The other potential limitations in tJ, e study by Wilkins and Mok ( 1991) are as 
follows. First, they did not attempt to test political cost variables as possible explanatory 
variables in their study. apart from the firm size variable, which could proxy for factors 
other than firm's political visibility. Other potential political visibility proxies include 
social responsibility disclosure, press coverage, taxation burden, and market 
14 However, the actual Income effect of capitalization on individual lessee firm depends on 
factors including the age of the leased asset, Its estimated useful life, and its implicit 
interest rate. 
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concentration (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Panchapakesan & McKinnon, 1992). In 
addition, they did not extend their sample to include lessee firms that 
capitalized/footnote disclosed their finance lease commitments in the other two years of 
the transitional period. It is an empirical question as to whether their findings would 
hold for the remaining two years of the transitional period. This is because there are 
plausible reasons why certain lessees might adopt capitalization in year 2 (or year 3) but 
chose not to in year 1 (or year 2). Firstly, these lessees were newly listed firms on the 
stock exchange in the relevant year. Secondly. these lessees, with certain motives, timed 
their adoption of AAS 17 to tl1elr advantage. 
Summary 
From the preceding analysis of the selected studies of a similar nature, there is a 
need for a stronger theoretical framework that would help in developing better testable 
hypotheses to explain management's decision to either capitalize or to disclose via 
footnote disclosure their finance lease commitments. Furthermore. there are possible 
improvements in the areas of research method and design that could be incorporated in 
this study. The following Chapter 4 develops the theoretical linkages that certain firm 
specific variables have to a decision to either capitalize finance lease commitments or 
disclose such commitments in the footnotes of the financial statements. Chapter 5 
elaborates on the research method and design employed in this study. 
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CBAPTER4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
BYPOTBESES FORMULATION 
IDtroductlon 
This chapter proceeds with a discussion of the theoretical framework underlying 
this study. This followed by a short discussion on the effects of capitalization of finance 
leases on lessees' financial statements. Finally. this chapter deltberates on the 
formulation of the research hypotheses which are tested in this study. 
Theoretical framework 
According to Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), accounting choices (as in this 
case, the lessees' choice of either capitalization or footnote disclosure of finance lease 
commitments) have economic consequences if changes in the rules used to calculate 
accounting numbers alter the distribution of firms· cash flows, or the wealth of parties 
who use those numbers for decision making. 15 Based on the extant literature, it is a 
logical inference that economic consequences are driven by contracting and monitoring 
costs (Holthausen & Leftwich. 1983). and signalling costs (Morris, 1987).16 Thus. the 
economic consequence of accounting policy choice is driven by contracting theory and 
signalling theory. The former is also associated with agency theory and political cost 
theory. This economic consequence theoretical framework is represented 
diagrammatically In Figure 1. The following two sections elaborate the components of 
this theoretical framework. the contracting theory and the signalling theory. 
15 
16 
It has been established, in chapter 2, that the requirements of AAS 17 to capitalize 
finance leases do have economic consequences. The economic consequence ls not in 
terms of affecting the firm's cash flows, but that capitalization of finance leases affect 
users· economic decision making processes. 
Morris {1987) demonstrates that agency theory and signalling theory seems to be 
competing theories, but In essence, they are consistent. 
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Coatractma them, 
According to Holthausen (1990), there are three alternative perspectives on 
accounting policy choice. They are opportunistic behavtor, information, and efficient 
contracting perspectives. Opportunistic behavtor (or opportunism) assumes that 
managers choose income increasing accounting policies that maximize their own 
compensation at the expense of shareholders (Christle & Zimmerman, 1994; 
Holthausen, 1990) .17 From the information perspective, the choice of accounting
policies reveals information about the future cash flows of the firms {Holthausen, 1990). 
In this study, opportunism and information perspectives are not applicable because of 
the following reasons. First, since lease capitalization has an income decreasing effect in 
the year of adoption, i.e .. the first year of capitalization (Abdel-khalik. 1981; El-Gazaar et 
al., 1986; Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). it is an unlikely opportunistic accounting policy.18
Second, lease capitalization does not affect lessee firms' cash flows because it is only a 
re-packaging of information (Abdel-khalik. 1981) and consequently, it is not an 
accounting policy that proVides additional information about managers' expectation of 
firms future cash flows. Hence, in this study, efficient contracting is assumed to be the 
general premise underlying the economic consequences of lease capitalization 
accounting policy choice. 
Accounting research based on the efficient contracting perspective examines the 
incentives to choose among alternative accounting methods because of the explicit and 
implicit contracts that rely on accounting numbers (Holthausen, 1990). Examples of the 
contractual agreements include lending agreements, management compensation plans, 
and firms' management/control structure. The efficient contracting perspective, with 
respect to accounting policy choice, hypothesises ti1at accounting methods will be 
17 
18 
For fuller discussion on contracting theory see, for example, Fama (1980), Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1986 & 
1990). 
see earlier footnote no. 14. 
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selected to mtnimtse agency costs and/or political costs amongst the various parties to 
the firm (including managers, shareholders, debtbolders, unions, politicians, and 
bureaucrats). Christle and Zimmerman (1994) also contend that "efficiency assumes 
accounting procedures facilitate internal declslon making and control, mln1mize taxes, 
reduce costly bond renegotiations, and minimize the costs of expected opportunism" (p. 
562). Thus, the end result is maximizing the value of the firm (Christie & Zimmerman, 
1994: Holthausen, 1990). 
These agency costs and political costs arise because of the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders, between managers (acting on behalf of 
shareholders) and debtholders. and between managers (on behalf of shareholders and 
debtholders), and politicians, bureaucrats. consumers and unions. in which a. decision 
made may serve the interest of one party but may not necessarily be in the best interest 
of the other party or parties. There are ample examples in the literature of accounting 
policy choice studies. in particular studies of single procedure choice, which have tested 
and found support to the various hypotheses dertved from efficient contracting theory 
including Zimmer (1986). Whittred (1987). Malmquist (1990). and Mian and Smith 
(1990). 
Signalling theory 
Signalling theory addresses the problem of information asymmetry in the 
markets, where the seller of goods or services know their quality but the buyer does 
not.19 In the economic environment where there is separation between control / 
management and ownership, information asymmetry exists between managers and 
external parties to the firms including shareholders, lenders. unions, politicians, and 
regulators. Managers are assumed to possess superior knowledge about their firms' 
19 For extensive discussion on signalling theory and Its application In accountlng/finance 
area, see, for example, Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984), Downes and Heinke! (1982), John 
and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Morris (1987) and Ross (1977). 
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future cash flows. Thus, the incentive to signal by accounting policy selection should be 
highest where tnfonnatton asymmetty is greatest (Morris, 1987). 
In the situation of tnfonnatlon asymmetry and 1n the absence of an appropriate 
signal of quality, buyers (i.e., the external parties to the firms) will price all firms at the 
average price. These costs of information asymmetry are borne by the manager of an 
above average quality flnn. The manager then has an incentive to signal his/her firm's 
above average quality to reduce this opportunity loss. In order to enable the buyers to 
differentiate between high and low quality firms, the managers will engage 1n appropriate 
quality signalling {for example, by adopting the "best" accounting and reporting policies 
recommended by the accounting profession). This is crucial if managers believe in the 
importance of users' perception towards the firms in their economic decision making 
(Abdel-kha:.k. 1981). The outcome would be that the buyers are then able to price the 
high and low quality firms differently based on the signals provided by these firms' 
managers. Thus, maximization of the value of the firms is achieved. 
The preceding discussion illustrates the applicability of signalling theory in 
accounting policy choice. to explain and predict management's choice of alternative 
accounting methods. Morris ( 1987) reached a conclusion. based on his comparative 
analysis of agency theory and signalling theory. that both theories "are consistent ... a 
considerable overlap exists between them" (p. 53). Thus, a combined signalling and 
efficient contracting theory may yield further insights into choice of accounting 
methods. "not obtainable from either theory alone" (p. 53). 
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:npre 1 
Contracting and 
monitoring cost 
Economic Consequences 
Agency cost Political cost -----. .-------
20 Figure 1 is adopted from Mangos (1991) with modlftcattons. 
Signalling cost 
Bn,otheaea formulation 
The following sections discuss the formulation of each research hypothesis that 
will be tested in this study. These hypotheses are developed from the efficient contracting 
and signalling perspectives With the following general premise: The objective of the firms' 
decisions to capitalize finance leases is to mitigate the agency /political costs incurred by 
these firms, and to signal as being high quality firms to the users' of published financial 
statements. This accounting policy choice has the implication of maximizing the value 
of the flnn (Holthausen. 1990). 
The research hypotheses are formulated in the uni-directional form. This is made 
possible because of the general expected effect of finance lease capitalization on lessees' 
balance sheet and income statement. Since capitalization means the recognition of a 
finance lease as both an asset and a liability, the balance sheet would reflect much 
higher gearing (Ashton. 1985; El-Gazaar et al., 1986: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992). 
Capitalization of leases also has the potential to adversely affect lessees' reported 
income. There is a consensus in the literature that lease capitalization shifts or defers 
income to hter years: It is an income-decreasing accounting policy choice in the year of 
adoption. i.e .. the first year of capitalization (Ashton. 1985: EI-Gazaar et al., 1986; 
Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).21 
Corporate control structure 
There is evidence in the contracting literature indicating a firm's choice of 
accounting method is systematically different depending upon its corporate control 
structure (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Whittred, 1987). From an efficient contracting 
perspective. it is hypothesised that management-controlled firms (hereafter called MC 
firms) have greater incentives to choose capitalization of finance lease accounting policy 
21 see earlier footnote no. 14. 
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than owner-controlled firms (hereafter called OC firms). The following arguments support 
this corporate control structure hypothesis. 
The basic characteristic of MC firms is the greater separation between 
management / control and ownership. This gives rise to greater agency costs for MC 
firms due to the asymmetric information and costly monitoring of managers' 
performance. This situation also serves as a possibility for managers of MC firms to 
behave opportunistically. As a response, the outside shareholders price protect22 
themselves and implement a mechanism that would entice managers to make economic 
decisions in the owners' best interest. One of the most common mechanism is a 
management compensation plan, which is normally a function of reported income (Antle 
& Smith, 1986; Lambert, Larcker & Baker, 1987). These responses are considered 
necessary in order to reduce the costs of expected opportunism by the managers. 
Since rational outside shareholders are price protected, managers of MC firms 
have greater incentives to select accounting policies that minimize the costs of expected 
opportunism. This type of response suggest that managers of MC firms select particular 
accounting policies for efficiency purposes. As capitalization of finance leases reduces 
income in the year of adoption. I.e .. the first year of capitalization, it consequently 
minimizes the costs of expected opportunism, Managers of MC firms are more likely to 
capitalize finance lease commitments than managers of OC firms. 23 
The corporate control structure hypothesis based on signalling theory produces a 
similar prediction to that of efficient contracting theory. It is hypothesised that MC firms 
are more likely to capitalize finance lease than OC firms. There are two lines of argument 
22 
23 
Price protect refers to the action where Mthe outside debt- and share-holders discount 
the price they are willing to pay for their claims for any expected managerial actions 
that reduce their future returns.· (Christle & Zimmerman, 1994 p. 541). 
However, since capitalization defers Income to later years (Ashton 1985, El-Gazaar et 
al .. 1986), the managers' compensation on average and over a number of periods may 
not be adversely affected. This may however, suggest some form of opportunism. 
Nevertheless, in the year of adoption the decision to capitalize ftnancc leases ts based 
on efficiency reason. 
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in support of this proposition. First, in a situation where there is greater information 
asymmetry between managers and interested external parties, including owners and 
debtholders, as in the case of MC firms, there is a greater incentive for such firms to 
signal by adopting appropriate recommended accounting policy to mitigate opportunity 
loss. This action can also be construed as a bonding mechanism by the managers of 
lessee firms. Second, the adoption of finance lease capitalization, a method deemed 
appropriate and relevant by the profession, is a signal to the market indicating that 
these firms are not using the alternative method (i.e.. footnote disclosure) to mislead 
interested external parties. As determined earlier. capitalization of finance leases better 
reflects a flnn's economic substance. 
By way of contrast. OC firms will be less inclined to engage in this capitalization 
of finance lease signal. This is because owners in OC firms have the ability to exert a 
direct influence on the behaviour of managers. consequently managers in OC firms have 
considerably less discretionary power. Thus. based on signalling theory, it is more likely 
that MC firms rather than OC firms will capitalize finance leases. 
There are consistent predictions between efficient contracting theory and 
signalling theory concerning the corporate control structure hypothesis in reference to 
the choice of either capitalization or footnote disclosure only for finance leases. Thus. 
hypothesis H 1 is formulated as follows. 
HI: Management-controlled firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than 
owner-controlled firms. 
Debt contracting 
The debt/ equity hypothesis. as expounded In the contracting literature, predicts 
that firms with large amounts of debt relative to equity in their capital structure will 
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tend to choose accounting methods which result in higher, or earlier reported income 
and oppose mandatory changes in accounting methods which would reduce, or delay 
the reporting of income (Watts & Zimmerman. 1986 and 1990). This implies that 
managers of firms with a high level of leverage are more likely to engage in opportunism. 
This ls because asymmetric information and costly monitoring prevent outside 
debtholders from perfectly monitoring managers (Christle & Zimmennan, 1994). 
In order to protect their interests, outside debtholders price protect themselves 
and implement a mechanism of restrictive covenants which are present in most debt 
issues, private and public. These restrictive covenants are put in place to prevent wealth 
transfers away from debtholders to equityholders, indicating a positive relationship 
between leverage and agency costs of debt (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Since the 
provisions contained in these covenants such as leverage and interest coverage are 
usually defined with reference to generally accepted accounting principles, a lessee could 
be in technical default if it capitalized its finance lease rather than disclosed them in the 
footnotes of their financial statements. This is because lease capitalization is likely to 
increase leverage ratios (Abdel-khalik. I 981: Ashton, 1985; El-Gazaar et al., 1986; 
Whittred & Zimmer, 1992). Furthermore. it has been found that borrowers perceive debt 
covenants as a more important factor than compensation contracts and political 
environment in their accounting policy choices (Gopalakrishnan & Parkash. 1995). 
Thus, from an efficient contracting perspective, capitalization of finance lease 
commitments by firms with low leverage ratios is an accounting policy that promotes 
efficiency in monitoring and bonding. This is a plausible argument because of the 
following reasons. First, low leveraged lessee firms are those firms that have greater 
capacity to increase debt to the extent that they are further away from the need to 
renegotiate their debt covenants brought about by the increase in debt through 
capitalization of finance leases. Second, since capitalization of finance leases shows the 
economic substance of the firms' overall debt obligations, it consequently facilitates 
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internal decision making and control. Finally, as capitalization also reduces income in 
the year of adoption, It also minlm17.es the costs of expected opportunism by managers. 
Thus, from an efficient contracting perspective, lessee firms with low leverage ratios are 
more likely to capitalize their finance lease commitments than firms with high leverage 
ratios. 
According to signalling theory, managers have an incentive to offer restrictive 
debt covenants to maximise the price at which debt is sold, and "indirectly to act as a 
signal about expected future earnings and expected levels of management 
compensation." (Morris, 1987 p. 51). Hence, firms with higher contractual leverage ratios 
have above average expected values, and arguably are above average quality when 
compared to firms with lower contractual leverage ratios. However. firms With leverage 
ratios nearing their contractual level may also be signalling the managers' inefficiency in 
managing the firms' resources. In addition, since capitalization of finance lease is the 
method advocated by the profession because it better reflects firms' true economic 
substance, high quality firms with low leverage ratios have greater incentives to 
capitalize their finance leases in order to differentiate them from lower qhality firms. 
Thus. It is hypothesised that low leveraged firms are more likely than high leveraged 
firms to capitalize finance leases. 
An ideal research design to test this hypothesis is to measure the spread between 
each firm's maximum contractual leverage ratio and its prevailing leverage ratio. 
However, this information is not readily available. Nevertheless, evidence from Duke and 
Hunt (1990), and Press and Weintrop (1990) indicate that leverage ratios are correlated 
with closeness to actua 1 debt covenant constraints, and therefore are good proxies for 
tightness of debt covenant constraints. Thus. consistent With efficient contracting 
theory and signalling theory, the debt contracting hypothesis is stated as follows: 
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H2: Low leveraged firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than high 
leveraged firms. 
In the context of this study, the firm size construct is not used to measure a 
firm's political visibility. Rather. firm size is a variable to proxy for a firm's information 
production costs (Ball & Foster, 1982; Firth, 1979). This hypothesis predicts that if 
information production costs related to certain accounting policy are high, then large 
firms are more likely to have the resources necessary to select such accounting policy. In 
the case of finance lease capitalization, it is considered that the information production 
costs are not trivial. These costs include the following. 
First. certain costs are incurred to assess the impact of capitalization on lessees 
financial statements. For example. there are the debt contracting costs associated with 
disclosures of increased debt. This includes the potential costs of renegotiation of debt 
agreements and / or the potential increase in costs of new debts to be raised. Second, 
additional bookkeeping costs associated with a new reporting system that differs from 
tax requirements (Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). Last but certainly not least, costs of 
training and education to enable preparers of financial statements to be familiar and 
competent with the capitalization requirement and related concepts, for example. 
implicit interest rates, present value of future obligations. and fair values (I-Iarris, 1983). 
Apart from the information production costs incurred, the potential benefits for 
large lessee firms to capitalize their finance lease commitments include the following. 
First, since capitalization reflects the true economic substance of the lessees' assets base 
and debt obligations. internal decision making and control would be facilitated. Second, 
as large firms tend to be firms that are complex (Abdel-khalik, 1995) and difficult to 
monitor, managers of these firms have greater incentives to select income decreasing / 
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deferral accounting policy, for example capitalization of finance leases, to mfnimize the 
costs of expected opportunism. 
Hence, from an efficient contracting perspective, it is hypothesised that Jarger 
lessee firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than smaller lessee firms. This is 
consistent with the prediction derived from signalling theory. It Is conceivable that larger 
firms also tend to be high quality firms. This is supported by the argument that a firm 
�ets larger (as measured by its revenue or assets or profits) because of its success 1n the 
market, which in tum depends on the market's perception of the firm's quality. In order 
to reinforce the market perception that they are high quality firms, larger lessee firms 
continue to engage in appropriate signalling. ln the context of this study, the signal 
selected by larger lessee firms is the capitalization of finance leases. Recall that 
capitalization reduces the alternative methods for reporting a lease transaction, provides 
a better reflection of lessees· economic substance and hence gives the impression of 
attempts not to mislead the market. 
Choi (1989). Firth (1979). Sami and Welsh (1992). and Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
have found firm size, as a prox-y for firms· information production costs. to be a 
significant explanatory variable in their respec�ive investigations. Thus, based on the 
preceding arguments and empirical evidence from the ilterat ...1re. H3 is formulated as 
follows. 
H3: Larger firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than smaller ftrms. 
Political visibility 
Political visibility (also referred to as politically sensitive or vulnerable) refers to 
the situation whereby a firm attracts a disproportionate share of scrutiny by the 
government and Its regulatory agencies or other interest groups (Including the general 
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public and trade unions), making it a potential target for the imposition of political 
costs. Political costs are the wealth redistributions away from the firm to the government 
and other sectors of its industry or the economy. The redistribution of wealth is 
normally effected through among others, the Imposition of taxes, removal of subsidies 
and licences, granting of wage increases, and restrictions on firm's activities. Financial 
statements are a source of information used by interested parties in singling out firms 
for wealth transfers. However, the extent to which these devices rely on accounting 
based data varies widely. There is a consensus in the literature that firms' political 
visibility is positively related With their reported income (Watts. 1977: Watts & 
Zimmerman. 1986: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992: Wong. 1988a and 1988b). The political 
costs hypothesis predicts that politically visible firms are more likely to select accounting 
methods which result in lower. or delay reported income (Watts & Zimmerman. 1986 and 
1990). Thus. from an efficient contracting perspective. it is hypothesised that since 
capitalization of finance leases results in lower reported income (which consequently 
minimizes the expected wealth transfers affected by the regulators and thereby protects 
the outside claimholders' interests). lessee firms \vith higher political visibility are more 
likely to capitalize finance leases than lessee firms \vith lower political visibility during 
the phase-in period.24 
The preceding political cost hypothesis is consistent \vith the prediction derived 
from signalling theory. A firm's level of political visibility is an incentive for such firm to 
engage in appropriate signalling to indicate their expected level of quality. As political 
visibility is a function of reported income. it is a fair assumption that politically Visible 
firms. due to the high level of reported income, are also high quality firms. Prior to 
introduction of MS 17. lessees had alternative methods for disclosing their lease 
transactions. With the availability of such flexibility, firms have the tendency to choose 
the alternative that reports the firms' performance in the most fa:vourable way. This 
24 The literature on single procedure accounting choice reveals empirical evidence which 
supports the political costs hypothesis (Bowen et al .. 1981: Daley & Vlgeland, i.983; 
Dhaliwal et al .. 1982). 
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arguably could mean that such firms are engaging in creative accounting to mislead 
interested external parties However, this action would result in adverse selection 
because there is no way for users' of financial statements to differentiate between high 
and low quality firms (Morns, 1987}. 
The early adoption of capitalization of finance leases during the phase-in period 
is a positive signal indicating a firm is relinquishing the flexibility to disclose lease 
transactions. At the same time, the signal is indicating to external parties that the firm 
is adopting an accounting practice advocated by the profession which will better reflect 
its economic substance. Thus, in an attempt to differentiate high and low quality firms, 
politically visible firms have greater incentive to capitalize finance leases during the 
phase-in period. 
H4: Firms with higher political visibility are more likely to capitalize finance leases 
than firms with lower political visibility. 
The level of press coverage Is used to measure firms· political visibility is . This is 
considered to be an appropriate construct because of "an expectation that firms that are 
constantly in the media spotlight are more susceptible to political !wealth] transfers 
than firms that rarely receive media attention" (Deegan & Carroll, 1993 p. 223}. Thus, 
the level of press coverage (a component of the media) encapsulates Nthe media's 
perception of the aggregate political visibility of a firm arising from one or a combination 
of specific sources" (Panchapakesan & McKinnon, 1992 p. 75).25 Empirical evidence 
supports the contention of a strong link between the level of press coverage and political 
visibility (Panchapakesan & McKinnon. 1992), and between press coverage and firm size 
(Laswad. 1991). 
25 Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992) argue that "ff a firm comes under governmental 
or interest group scrutiny because of speclflc circumstances such as, for example, the 
industry it operates, the working and pay conditions of Its employees, or the market 
position it occupies, the press and media will devote proportionately more space to the 
firm ... that attract public attention: (p. 75). 
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PlnaDclal performance 
The bonus plan hypothesis has been extensively tested in numerous accounting 
policy choice studies in the USA (Abdel-khalik, 1985; Ayres, 1986: Bowen et al •• 1981: 
El-Gazaar et al •• 1986; Scott, 1991). This hypothesis predicts that managers of firms 
with management compensation plans tied to reported income are more likely to choose 
accounting methods that report higher or earlier income. 26 This hypothesis has been 
thoroughly tested 1n the USA because the information relating to the plans parameters 
are publicly available. This is not the case for Australia (Wilkins & Mok, 1991; Whittred 
& Chan. 1992; Zimmer, 1986), and as result a direct test of the bonus plans hypothesis 
has not been employed in Australian accounting policy choice studies. However, a 
review of the literature has revealed that most Australian commercial organisations have 
instituted bonus schemes tied to reported income or other performance indicators 
including return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), into 
management/executive compensation plans (Deegan. 1994: Klinedinst, 1991; 
Lawriwsky. 1982; Smith & Watts, 1982; Watt. 1988). 
Nevertheless. even in the absence of explicit Income-based bonus plans, 
management may have an incentive to mitigate decreases in the level of reported income 
(Christle & Zimmerman. 1994; Sarni & Welsh, 1992; Trombley, 1989). The primary reason 
for this is that poor performance relative to the preceding year may lead to termination, 
whereas improved performance can justify requests for increased compensation. Since 
capitalization of finance leases results in decreased reported income, ceteris pa.ribus, the 
incentive to adopt the capitalization method is not uniform across lessee ftnns. Thus, 
from an efficient contracting perspective, It Is hypothesised that firms with greater 
improved financial performance relative to the preceding year have greater incentive to 
capitalize finance leases than firms with smaller improved financial performance relative 
26 However. this general hypothesis does not necessarily hold in situation where the 
bonus has a ceiling and tt Is near or at maximum level. In this situation, managers are 
more likely to defer income to the next reporting period (Healy, 1985). 
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to the preceding year. This hypothesis is supported by the argument that since 
capitalization reduces income in the year of adoption, it consequently mlnimizes the 
costs of expected opportunism by managers. Furthermore, capitalization of finance 
leases accounting policy also facilitates efficiency in monitoring and bonding managers' 
behavtor because It better reflects a firm's economic substance. 
Signalling theory yields consistent predictions in this aspect. Firms with bigger 
growth in income are generally considered as high quality firms due to the fact that 
bigger growth results in maximizing the value of the firms. Thus, in order to reinforce 
their high quality status, firms With bigger percentage growth in income have greater 
incentive to capitalize their finance leases than firms With smaller percentage growth in 
income. This is a positive signal because capitalization removes the possibility of flrms to 
elect off-balance sheet (footnote) disclosure which gives the impression of attempts to 
mislead shareholders and debtholders. By way of contrast. firms with smaller growth in 
income (which also means low quality firms) do not have the same incentive to 
capitalize their finance leases. This is because capitalization results in lower reported 
income which In tum reinforces the perception of users of financial statements as being 
low quality firms. Thus. hypothesis H5 Is stated as follows. 
H5: Finns With bigger percentage growth In pre-adoption income are more likely to 
capitalize finance leases than firms with smaller percentage growth in pre­
adoption income. 
Overseas association 
A lessee is considered to have an overseas association if it is either (1) a 
subsidiary of a foreign parent in Canada or the UK or the USA, or (2) where its shares 
are simultaneously listed in Canada or the UK or the USA. It is hypothesised that firms 
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with either one or both of these characteristics are more likely to capitalize finance 
leases during the phase-in period. An in-depth discussion of this hypothesis follows. 
First, Australian subsidiaries of foreign parents in Canada, the UK or the USA. 
where finance lease capitalization policy is already fully 1n force, are likely to adopt the 
same practices of their parents (Bazley et al., 1985; Gay, Farley & Peirson, 1993). 
Assuming these foreign parents are capitalizing their finance leases, it is hypothesised 
that their subsidiaries 1n Australia are more likely to capitalize their finance leases.27
This uniform practice of accounting for finance leases would facilitate the consolidation 
of financial statements by the parents. and at the same time allow comparability of 
performance between subsidiaries in Australia and in the home country. 
Second, Australian lessee firms that are also listed in countries (Canada. the UK 
and the USA) where capitalization of finance leases is mandatory have greater incentive 
to follow suit and capitalize their finance leases. This is because the additional costs to 
account for and to report capitalized finance leases have already been incurred in 
complying with the overseas listing requirements (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 
1981). In addition. these lessee firms have the necessary eJ1.--perience. which makes them 
more likely to capitalize finance leases early. 
The benefit accruing to firms with an overseas association that adopt the 
capitalization of l.nance leases is in terms of the favourable perception by external 
parties, including Australian investors. analysts, and regulators. This would result in 
lower agency costs and lower political co�ts. Thus. for lessee firms with an overseas 
association, capitalization of finance leases promotes efficiency in monitoring managers' 
performance. In addition, since these lessee firms are complying with the "best" practice 
advocated by the accounting profession, this action can be construed as signalling to 
27 It Is assumed here that since the finance lease capitalization requirement has become 
mandatory in these countries, there ts no reason to believe that lessees in these 
countries are not complying with this requirement. 
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the market that they are not endeavouring to mislead external parties. Consequently. it 
is an indication that they are high quality ftrms. 
Recent empidcal studies have reported findings in support of the components of 
this hypothesis. Cooke (1991), Malone. Fries and Jones, (1993), Meek and Gray (1989). 
and Saudagaran and Biddle ( 1992) have found evidence suggesting a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and a firm's listing on foreign stock 
exchanges. In addition, studies by Bazley et al. (1985) and Gay et al. (1993) reveal 
findings which suggest that a subsidiary relationship is a significant predictor in 
managements' decision concerning voluntru:y lease disclosures and presentation of 
value-added statements respectively. Thus hypothesis H6 is formulated as follows. 
H6: Firms with an overseas association are more likely to capitalize finance leases 
than firms With no overseas association. 
Summary 
This chapter presented a discussion on the proposed theoretical framework 
underlying this study. Subsequently, a set of hypotheses was developed based on the 
economic consequences theory (efficient contracting and signalling). It is hypothesised 
that lessee firms bearing the characteristics of being ( l} manager-controlled firm. (2) low 
leveraged, (3) larger in size, (4) politically visible. (5} positive change in profitability, and 
(6) with overseas association. are more likely to capitalize their finance leases during the
phase-in period of AAS 17 so as to reduce their agency and political costs, and also to 
signal their status as high quality firms. In the next chapter, matters concerning the 
research methodology of this study are expounded. These matters include the 
discussions on sample selection. definition of variables, and research design. 
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CBAPTBRS 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological aspects of this study. The discussions 
are on the following areas: First, the selection of the final reporting sample. Second, the 
deftnltlon of relevant dependent and independent variables. Third, the data sources that 
will be utilised in the data collection and data analysis stages. Last. the statistical 
techniques to be employed. 
Sample selection 
This study is a cross-sectional study of financial reporting practices of listed 
lessee firms' finance lease commitments during the transitional period between 1985 and 
1987. Lessees' reported in the Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) 
Annual Reports Microfiche Files (1985, 1986 and 1987) was used as the sample of this 
study.28 The sample was subjected to a further sampling phase through which a final 
reporting sample was selected after satisfying the sampling criteria. 
The sampling design of this study is as follows. Upon inspection of the AGSM 
File, Australian lessee firms who adopted AAS 17 (either capitalising or disclosing in the 
footnotes their finance leases transactions) in 1985, 1986 and 1987 were identified. The 
28 The AGSM File consists of the top 500 listed companies In Australia by market 
capitalisation. The AGSM File that was used in this study is housed at the Edith Cowan 
University, Churchlands' campus libraty. 
This study acknowledges the limitations of the AGSM File. Deegan and Carroll (1993) 
note that due to the fact that the AGSM File only consists of the top 500 Australian 
listed companies, the results based on this sample may be more specJflc to larger ftrms. 
Further, Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) assert that the AGSM File does not include 
large private companies, and allowance has not been made for the dlfferent accounting 
methods, e.g., depreciation / amortisation policies, used by companies In arriving at 
balance sheet and profit and loss figures. 
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sample selection ls subjected to the constraint that a lessee firm once identified as a 
capitalizer (footnote discloser) in one year could not be selected again as footnote 
discloser (capitalizer) In the subsequent year(s). Subsequently, these lessee firms were 
classlfled as capitalizer and non-capitalizer (I.e., footnote discloser) across ttme.29 Thus,
the test or treatment group consists of the capitalizers, and the control group is made 
up of the non-capitalizers. This sample selection and classlflcation process gives rise to 
potential self-selection bias problems which are normally encountered in most 
accounting studies tn which firms are not randomly assigned to treatment and control 
groups (Foster. 1980; Abdel-khalik, 1990; Rayburn, 1990).30 
Deftnltlon of variables 
In this section, the definition and the measurement of the relevant dependent 
and independent variables are discussed. Table 2 presents the summary of the 
descriptions of these variables. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable of the study is the accounting policy choice by the lessees 
concerning their finance leases. This choice is captured as a dichotomous dummy 
variable. Lessees that capitalized finance leases were given a value of 1, and lessees that 
adopted note disclosure of their finance lease transactions were given a value of 0. 
29 
30 
This sample selection process is consistent With the approach taken by Wbittred and 
Chan (1992}, but differs slightly whether the process is with or without replacement of 
subjects. This Is because, the sample selection process in this study is non-random. 
One method for correcting self-selection bias is the employment of "Two-stage switching 
regression· (Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Maddala, 1991; Shehata, 1991). However, due to the 
unavailability of appropriate factors to be incorporated into the regression analyses, 
this study is unable to assess or correct for any such bias. 
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Table 2 
Pefcdatl9AI of Variablt1 
Variables 
Pe»endent u,lablc 
ADOPI' 
Inde,pendent yarlablel 
OCMC(l) 
DEBT 
SIZE(l) 
PRESS 
PERF(l) 
OSEAS 
Deacrlptlou 
(O, l) finance lease accounting choice; footnote 
disclosure (O); capitalization (1).
(O, l) owner-controlled (OC) lf one party has more than 
10% of voting shares, and exercise active control, or lf 
one party has more than 20% of voting shares (0); 
otherwise manager-controlled (MC} (1). 
Total liabilities divtded by total tangible assets 
Total assets 
Level of press coverage as cited in the ABI 
Adoption year net income less prior year net income 
divtded by prior year net income 
(0, 1) no overseas association in terms of foreign parent 
relationship. or overseas listing status (O); otherwise 
(1). 
Financial variables, DEBT, SIZE and PERF. are adjusted to remove the effect of 
capitalization of finance leases (see Appendix Cl. 
Altematlve pro:z.y 
OCMC(2) 
SIZE(2) 
S1ZE(3) 
PERF{2) 
Description 
Percentage of ordinary shares held by other than the 
top 20 shareholders; widely held = MC firm; narrowly 
held = OC firm. 
Total revenue 
Net income after tax before extraordinary items 
(O, l) firms with negative change (i.e., decrease in profit 
or increase in loss} in net income tax before 
extraordinary items (O}; firms with positive change (i.e., 
increase in profit or decrease in loss) (1). 
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ladepend.ent ftdabla 
Consistent with the number of research hypotheses, there are six Independent 
variables tested. Subsequent discussion relates primarily to the main definition and 
measurement construct of each variable. 31 
(I) Corporate structure (OCMC)
This variable ls measured by a dichotomous dummy variable {0, 1) with OC firms 
were given the value of O. whilst MC firms were given the value of 1. Consistent with the 
criteria used by Dhaliwal et al., (1982), firms were classified as OC if one party holds 
more than 1 OOAI of the voting shares and exercise active control, or if one party hold more 
than 20% of the voting shares. Active control Is taken to mean representation on the 
Board of Directors or in firm's management (e.g., Managing Director or Chief Executive 
Officer). When a firm could not be identified as OC firm, the firm is classified as MC firm 
(Whittred, 1987).32 
(2) Debt contracting (DEBT)
Whittred and Zimmer ( 1986) and Stokes and Tay ( 1988) have found that the 
most frequently used measurement of leverage In Australian public debt issues is the 
ratio of total liabilities (excluding contingent liabilities) divided by total tangible assets. 
31 However, this study will also attempt to employ and test alternative measurements as no 
single construct can adequately capture or proxy the true dimensions of the 
independent variables contained in the disclosure model (Watts & Zimmennan, 1990).
This approach was also taken In order to avoid criticism of arbitrary selection of the
proxies for the various independent variables. These alternative measurement 
constructs are provided in the footnote following the definitions of each variable and 
also in Table 2. 
32 An alternative proxy is the percentage of ordinary shares held by other than the top 20
shareholders. A widely held shareholding can be considered as an indication of the
firm concerned to be MC firm; narrowly held shareholding ls therefore an Indication of
OC firm. This is consistent with arguments offered by Craswell and Taylor (1992) and
Whittred (1987). 
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Thus, consistent with this finding, the same ratio ls used to proxy for leverage in this 
stucly.33 
(3) Finn size (SIZE)
There are several measures for firm size as cited in the literature. However, there 
is no reason to choose one measure of size over another as no proxy for size should 
outperform another (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979). Nevertheless, 1n the context of this 
study, the firm size variable is measured by the natural logarithm of firm's total assets. 
This proxy is considered appropriate as it reflects the overall resources available to the 
flrms.34 
(4) Political visibility (PRESS)
Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992) 1·eported that the level of press coverage in 
a calender year was a good proxy for a firm's political visibility as perceived by the media. 
The level of press coverage was me�sured as the number of times during the year an 
article about the firm appeared in the 27 leading newspapers and business magazines 
reviewed In 1985 (29 publications In 1986, and 32 publications in 1987) by the 
Australian Business Index (ABI). This measure is consistent With the one used by 
Deegan and Carroll ( 1993) and Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992). 
33 
34 
Other measures of leverage that have been either commonly found in debt covenants or 
tested in previous studies are the ratios: (1) total liabilities dlvtded by shareholders 
funds (Whlttred & Zimmer, 1986; Stokes & Tay, 1988), and (2) total liabilities dlvided 
by total assets. The latter ratio has been used quite extensively in previous studies 
especially those in the USA environment. However. since it is very likely that these 
constructs of leverage to be highly correlated with one another due to common 
denominator or common numerator, this study will only test the ratio total liabilities 
dlvtded by total tangible assets. 
The natural logarithm of a firm's total revenue has also been used in previous studies 
as proxy for firm's Information production costs (for example, Choi (1989) and Sarni and 
Welsh (1993) among others). Deegan and H�am (1991) and Wong (1988a & b) suggest 
that net income after tax before extraordinary items Is a better proxy for firm size 
because it is a proxy which tnkes into account the relative magnitude of positive and 
negative wealth transfers. Accordingly, these constructs would also be tested. 
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(5) Financial performance (PERF)
Consistent with Sarni and Welsh (1992). a ratio was used to measure the change 
of preadoption income as proxy for this variable. This ratio was calculated as: Adoption 
year net income less prtor year net income divided by prtor year net income. 35 
(6) Overseas association (OSEAS)
OSEAS is a dummy vartable to represent whether a firm is (1) a subsidiary of a 
foreign listed firm in Canada or the UK or the USA; and/ or (2) concurrently listed in 
Canada or the UK or the JSA. Firms that possessed either of these charactertstlcs were 
given the value of 1, otherwise the value O were allocated to them. 
Data sources 
The primary source of data is the AGSM Annual Reports Microfiche File. Apart 
from this. other source of data utilised include the publications by Stock Exchange 
Research Pty Ltd, the Australian Business Index and Jobson's Public Company 
Yearbook. From these sources, the information that were gathered for all lessees in the 
final reporting sample are tabulated in Appendix A. The industry membership of the 
reporting sample as classified by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges (AASE) is 
reported in Appendix B. 
35 Scott (1991) used a dichotomous dummy variable to proxy for change in firm's 
preadoption Jncome. As an alternative, thJs proxy was also used. Firms with postttve 
change in their preadoption net income were given the value of 1, whilst firms with 
negattve in their preadoptlon net income were given the value of 0. 
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The research design of this study is a pooled cross-sectional analysts for the 
period 1985 to 1987.36 A between groups quasi-experimental design is used to test the 
research hypotheses. A multivariate analysis is considered to be the appropriate 
technique in View of the arguments forwarded by Bazley et al .. (1985), Scott (1991), and 
Tabachnik and Fidell (1989). Bazley et al., (1985) and Tabachnik and Fidell (1989) 
suggest that if it is suspected that there may have been some inter-dependence amongst 
the independent variables, then a multivariate analysis is necessary. Scott (1991) further 
argues that since political costs and agency costs (possibly also signalling costs) are 
likely to be present in varying degrees and With opposite influence on management 
across firms, Ma multivariate analysis that assesses the marginal impact of each while 
controlling for the other is appropriate" {p. 66). The specific multivariate technique 
chosen is the Logistic regression. It is chosen over other regression techniques, namely 
the OLS regression and the Probit regression, based on the findings of studies by Stone 
and Rasp (1991). and Maddala (1991) which examined numerous accounting choice 
studies· statistical methodologies. 37 
36 
37 
Whlttred and Chan ( 1992) found difficulty in deciding between a time series or a 
pooled cross-sectional analysis methodology for their study. However, In this study a 
pooled cross-sectional analysis Is considered appropriate because: First, it Is 
conceivable that lessee firms that adopted capitalisation differ from those that adopted 
note disclosure policy. Second, It Is not difficult to define what constitutes an 
appropriate control group. I.e .. lessee firms that had finance lease commitments and 
chose to disclose such commltmeuts In the notes. rather than capitalizing them. 
Logistic regression calculates Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) for the parameters 
with each independent variables. Logistic regression was employed in this study based 
on the findings by Stone and Rasp I 1991 I that: 
whenever the functional form of the relationship Is non-linear (as Is usually the 
case In dichotomous accounting policy choice studies), using OLS rather than 
logit can result in higher misclassification rates. a number of meaningless 
probability estimates. and less powerful tests of parameter estimates. Given 
these problems ... logit rather than OLS ... be the preferable method ... even 
when sample sizes technically are not ·1arge enough·. {p. 184) 
Maddala (1991} concluded that for accounting studies, even in small samples, the 
available evidence indicates that it is preferable to use problt or logtt models rather 
than regression when the dependent variable Is dichotomous. 
Furthermore, Aflfl and Clark { 1984) assert that logistic regression is appropriate when 
both categorical and continuous variables are used, as in this study. 
53 
Prior to performing the logistic regression, univariate diagnostics are undertaken 
to screen the data for the evaluation of the assumption of univariate nonnality. 1bis is 
despite logistic regression requires far fewer assumptions than multiple regression 
analysts: and even when the assumptions for multiple regression analysts are satisfied, 
logistic regression still performs well (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989: Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & Black, 1995: Maddala, 1991; Stone & Rasp, 1991). Tabachnik and Fidell 
(1989) suggest that the starting point Is to analyse the descriptive statistics of each 
independent variable. A normally distributed variable should have a skewness and 
kurtosis value of zero; Indicating that the mean is equal to median. Additional 
univariate diagnostics are performed including graphical examinations (histogram, box­
whisker plots. and normal probability plots) and statistical tests (Shapiro-Wilks test and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). If the variables' distributions are not normally distributed. 
then these variables should be transformed to remedy for outliers. non-normality and 
heteroscedaclty (Erickson & Nosanchuk; 1992; Hair et al.. 1995; Tabachnik & Fidell. 
1989). 
Multivariate diagnostics are also performed before and after the logistic regression 
analysis. The objectives of these diagnostics are ( 1) to assess multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. and (2) to identify Influential observations that would impact the 
logistic estimations (Belsley et al.. 1980; Fox. 1991; Hair et al., 1995). In assessing 
multicollinearity, the relevant statistics are the bivariate correlations. the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). and the tolerance levels. Influential observations can be detected 
by analysing the studentized residuals (SRESID], the leverage points (LEVER), Cook's 
distance (COOK). and the change in the logistic coefficients when a case is deleted from 
the model (DFBETA). 38 
38 All these statistical tests and diagnostics are performed using the statistical software 
"SPSS for Macintosh" (SPSS. 1990) and "SYSTAT' (SYSTAT, 1990). 
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The logistic regression model has six independent variables. However, since 
alternative proxy variables have been developed for OCMC, SIZE, and PERF, this study 
employs a sensitivity analysis by testing a total of 12 logtstic regression mode.ts, of which 
one will be selected based on its goodness-of-fit with all independent va_rfables 
(thereafter referred to as the explanatocy power), significance level, and classtftcation 
accuracy rate. 39 In order to support this selection, the selected model is subjected to a
valtdation process whereby the sample is split into two groups and the logistic regression 
analyses are performed accordingly. The objective of this process is to find evidence that 
would lend support and validity of the original selected model (Hair, et al., 1995 p. 
147).40
39 
40 
The basic logistic regression model is expressed as follows: 
y(O,IJ = o:l + Pl OCMC + p2 DEBT+ P3 SIZE+ P4 PRESS+ ps PERF + P6 OSEAS
+E
where 
In logistic regression the following relevant !>tatlstlcs are noted. First. to determine 
goodness-of-fit, the m:Jdel chi-square Is comparable to the overall F test for OLS 
regression (SPSS Inc., 1990). Second. In testing hypotheses about the coefficients, the 
Wald statistic is comparable to the t-statlstic in OLS muitiple regre.ssion (Hair et al., 
1995: SPSS Inc., l 990). Third. classification accuracy rate refers to the ability of the 
model. on an overall basis, to correctly classify the sample into the corresponding 
groups, which in this study relate to the capitalizer and non-capitalizer groups. Aldrich 
and Nelson (1984) and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) suggest different versions of 
pseudo-R2 statistics, which is also comparable to the R2 of OLS regression, as a 
measure of explanatory power of the logistic models. However, because Kit is not 
universally accepted. let alone used" (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984, p. 57), and the 
Kdifficulty with ... interpretation" (Demaris, 19921, this study will not be reporting this 
statistic. 
Hair et al .. ( 1995) state that the objective of tilt validation process ·is to ensure that the 
results are generalizable to the population and not specific to the sample used In 
estimation� (p. 147). They suggest that the most direct approach to validation is to 
obtain another sample from the population and compare the results of the two samples. 
This approach is however not practical In this study due to the nature of the sampling 
frame and the sample selection process discussed earlier. In view of such a limitation, 
the spllt4sample approach taken in this study, as recommended by Hair et al., (1995). 
Demaris (1992, pp. 55-56), suggests a statistic 4 cross4validation probability of chance 
error CPREcv) - that measures the predictive efficacy in logistic regression. This PREcv 
indicates the level of reduction in prediction errors when the full model ls used to 
predict the phenomenon. 
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Summary 
is the constant value; 
is the dependent variable taking the value ( 1) if the lessee firm 
capitalized finance leases. and (O) otherwise, i.e .• by footnote disclosure; 
represents the coefficient of the explanatory variables. 
is the residual or prediction error 
This chapter elaborated the sample selection process, the definitions of the 
dependent and independent variables, the data sources used, and the various aspects of 
the research design of this study. In the following chapter. the results of the data 
analysis are reported. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER& 
EIIPJRICAL RESULTS 
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the various statistical analyses performed to 
test the research hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The results are presented in four 
major sections. First. characteristics of the sample selected are reported. This is followed 
by a discussion on the descriptive statistics and the diagnostics performed prior to the 
multivariate analysis. Third, an analysis of the results of the logistic regression including 
the validation process is presented. which is followed by a summary. 
Sample characteristics 
Table 3 reports the composition and industry membership of the 1985-1987 
sample; a total of 314 lessee firms classified into the capitalizer group with 67 lessee 
firms and the non-capitalizer group with 247 lessee firms. A preliminary analysis of Table 
3 shows that the number of resource firms in the capitalizer group is relatively more 
than those in the non-capitalizer group. This is also the case for the other industries. 
This suggests that there is a relationship between industry membership and the decision 
to capitalize finance lease commitments. The statistical evidence supports this 
proposition. The chi-square analysis reveals that there is a significant relationship 
between firms' industry membership and their finance lease accounting policy choice (x2 
= 12.850; d.J = 3; p = 0.005). 
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Tables 
8em1te CrnnlMJD!el Gl'OIQ)ld Ugder Malm IDdJllta Claulflcatlon; 1985 · 1987 
Industry Capitalizer Non-Capitalizer Total 
n % n % n % 
Industrtal & Commercial 35 52 183 74 218 69 
Resources 21 31 47 19 68 22 
Financial Institutions 2 3 4 2 6 2 
Diversified companies 9 14 13 5 22 7 
Total 67 100 247 100 314 100 
x2 = 12.a5o; dJ. = 3; p = 0.005 
Descriptive statistics and diagnostics 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables appear In Table 4 - Panels 
A and B. An examination of the descriptive statistics of the interval-scaled variables in 
Panel A shows that six of these variables suffer substantial skewness indicating non­
normality. The results of supplementary graphical analysis and statistical tests for 
normality including normal probability plot. Shapiro-Wilks test. and Kolmogorov­
Smimov test support the earlier findings of examination of the descriptive statistics. 
These variables are: PRESS, DEBT. SIZE(l}, SIZE{2), SIZE{3). and PERF(l}. 
Results of the preceding evaluation of assumptions lead to transformation of the 
relevant variables to reduce their skewness, reduce the number of outliers. and improve 
the normality, linearity and homoscedacity of residuals. Natural logarithmic 
transformation was used on PRESS. SIZE(l), S1ZE(2) and DEBT. Square-root 
transformation was used on S1ZE(3) and PERF{l). The results of these transformations 
appear 1n Panel B of Table 4. 
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Table4 
Panel A - Petcdptlye stattat1c;1 1985-1987 CBefore Data Transfo1m1ttonl 
(1) Capitalizers (N = 67) (2) Non-capitalizers( N = 247)
Expected Interval-
relation variable Mean Median so Mean Median so 
(1) > (2) OCMC{2) 24.122 21.010 13.443 27.565 26.700 14.698 
(1) < (2) DEBT 0.540 0.513 0.255 0.634 0.518 1.883 
(1) > (2) SIZE(l) 430039.750 68192.000 1542575.478 371456.721 86419.000 795373.824 
S1ZE(2) 289744.597 58202.000 935121.075 415221.146 73663.000 1076056.433 
fe S1ZE(3) 19159.133 3012.500 97230.496 15994.642 3193.000 450'l2.360 
(1) > (2) PRESS 65.075 21.000 133.398 47.356 21.000 � 76.542 
(1) > (2) PERF(l) -564.013 7.163 4299.489 157.369 19.261 2648.982 
Ordinal-
variable (0) (1) (0) (1) 
OCMC(l) 51 16 186 61 
PERF(2) •• 22 34 60 184 
OSEAS 62 5 222 25 
•• Due to missing values, some companies are excluded.
Table4 
lMcJ P - Pc•cdpti:re stat11t1c1 1985-1987 l'After Data Tn.nsformatlonl 
(1) Capitalizers (N= 67) (2) Non-capitalizers (N = 247)
Expected Interval-
relation variable Mean Median SD Mean Median so 
(1) > (2) OCMC(2) 24.122 21.010 13.443 27.565 26.700 14.698 
{I)< (2) LnDEBT 0.411 0.406 0.167 0.407 0.409 0.251 
(1) > (2) LnSIZE(l) 11.380 11.129 1.644 11.540 11.367 1.624 
LnS1ZE(2) 10.751 10.972 2.166 11.110 11.207 2.244 
8 Sq5IZE(3) 333.916 318.866 80.183 334.444 319.149 53.066 
(1} > (2} LnPRESS 3.238 3.091 1.292 3.112 3.091 1.268 
(1) > (2) SqPERF(l) 174.918 178.126 23.914 178.444 178.160 6.102 
Ordinal-
variable (0) (I} (0) (1) 
OCMC(l) 51 16 186 61 
PERF(2) •• 22 34 60 184 
OSEAS 62 5 222 25 
•• Due to missing values, some companies are excluded.
A check on the direction of the mean differences of the tnteival-scaled variables 
between the capitalizer and non-capitalizer groups discloses that only LnPRESS has its 
mean differences 1n the hypothesised direction. Toe others, i.e., OCMC(2), LnDEBT, 
LnSIZE( l), LnS1ZE(2), SqS1ZE(3), and SqPERF(l), have the direction contrary to 
expectation. However, the findings may not hold 1n subsequent multivariate analysts. 
Table 5 reports the correlation analysis among the independent variables. 
Consistent with the results in the separate cross-sectional analysis, the present sample 
also exhibits a number of significant bivariate correlations. For example, between 
LnSIZE(l) and OCMC{2). between PERF(2) and LnPRESS, and between LnDEBT and 
LnSIZE(2). This finding indicates some inter-dependence amongst the independent 
variables, and thus, lends support to the appropriateness of multivariate regression 
analysis, specifically the logistic regression (Bazley et al., 1985; Tabachnik & Fidell. 
1989). Except for the bivariate correlations among the alternative constructs for firm size 
(to be used separately In sensitivity analysis). none of the other bivariate correlations 
reach 0.8. Thus, It is inferred that harmful multicollinearity among the independent 
variables is not present. (Farrar & Gaulber. 1967: Lewis-Beck, 1987). An examination of 
the tolerance levels and VIFs also corroborates this inference (Belsley et al., 1980; Fox. 
1991). 
Logistic regression results 
Results of the sensitiVity analysis of the logistic regression appear in Table 6 -
Panels A to D.41 Only models 7. 8, 10. 11 and 12, are statistically significant. On an 
overall basis, the Nbest" model is Model 10 because It has the highest explanatoxy power 
(model x2 = 12.672; dJ. = 6). most significant (p = 0.0485), and a comparatively high 
classification accuracy rate of 81.53%.
41 Senstuvity analysis was performed because for certain variables, there are more than 
one construct to proxy for the variables. Consequently, 12 logistic regression models 
were developed and tested. 
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Tables 
Variable OCMC(l) OCMC(2) LnDEBr LnSIZE(l) LnS1ZE(2) S1ZE(3) LnPRESS PERF(l) PERF(2) OSEAS 
OCMC(l) 1.000 
OCMC(2) 0.510 I.OOO
(0.000) 
LnDEBr I -0.069 -0.085 I.OOO
(0.110) (0.069) 
LnSIZE(l) 0.075 0.131 0.0323 1.000 
e (0.091) (0.011) (0.000) 
LnS1ZE(2) 0.106 0.190 0.297 0.850 1.000 
(0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SqS1ZE(3) I 0.114 0.190 0.107 0.696 0.706 1.000 
(0.023) (0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnPRESS I 0.077 0.190 0.213 0.670 0.515 0.459 1.000 
(0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SqPERF{l) I 0.019 -0.026 0.093 0.070 0.042 0.263 0.079 1.000 
(0.372) (0.328) (0.054) (0.114) (0.233) (0.000) (0.087) 
PERF(2) I 0.003 0.059 0.039 0.200 0.219 0.476 0.088 0.269 1.000 
(0.473) (0.156) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) 
OSEAS I -0.084 -0.149 -0.040 0.122 0.169 0.172 -0.064 0.003 0.079 1.000 
(0.()_E>S) (0.005) (0.241) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.126) (0.478) (O.�) 
Further examination of the result of Model 10 shows that the coefficient 
LnDEBT, LnPRESS, and OSEAS are in the hypothesised direction, but only LnPRESS ls 
highly slgntftcant at p < 0.05. Thus there Is strong support for the efficiency perspective 
hypothesis H4, that capitalization is positively related to the level of press coverage as 
proxy for a ftnn's political visibility. There is no evidence to accept the other five research 
hypotheses. 
In Model 10, the coefficients OCMC(2), LnS1ZE(2), and SqPERF(l) are not in the 
expected direction. However. only OCMC(2) and SqPERF(l) are significant at p < 0.05. 
The implication of this finding is that capitalization decision is more likely for lessee 
firms that had narrowly-held shareholdings: and lessee firms with negative change in 
net income from prior year. 
Additional multivariate diagnostics were considered necessary to determine the 
presence of any influential observation that could have impacted and biased the model's 
estimations. The studentlzed residuals. leverage points. DFBETA and Cook's statistics 
were examined and compared with the numerical cutoffs proposed by Hair et al., (1995) 
and Fox {1991). The finding indicates absence of influential observations. 
The next stage is to assess the validity and efficacy of Model l 0. This is achieved 
by performing the split-sample validation process and the estimation of cross-validation 
probability chance of error (PREcvl- In the split-sample validation process, the original 
sample was randomly divided into two sub-samples (hereafter referred to as sub-1 and 
sub-2). Logistic regressions were performed for sub-1 and sub-2 using the same 
independent variables in Model 10. Results of this process appear in Table 7. On an 
overall comparison. it appears that Model 10 is valid and generalisable model beyond the 
sample. This is inferred from the result that Model 10 has highest explanatory power 
and at a lowest significance level than sub-1 and sub-2. And its classification accuracy 
rate Is in between that of sub-1 and sub-2. 
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Table& 
Panel A - Rgglta of J.otlltic BIOeHIPP,; 1985.1987 IN• S14l 
Model 1 Model2 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
vanable relation Wald stat. Wald stat. 
Constant ? 5.3577 4.0403 
0.6846 0.4167 
OCMC(l) + 0.1448 0.1863 
0.1640 0.2681 
LnDEBT 1.4185 1.3770 
1.8949b I.857ob
LnSIZE(l) + -0.2714
3.2303a 
LnS1ZE(2) + -0.1468 
2.4555b 
SqSIZE(3) + 
LnPRESS + 0.3713 0.2580 
3.6872a 2.7399a 
SqPERF(l) + -0.0314 -0.0303
0.7861 0.7572
OSEAS + 0.2607 0.2106 
0.2280 0.1508 
Model x2 9.353 8.445 
(p= 0.1547) (p= 0.2073) 
% correctly classified 82.31% 82.31% 
a Slgnlflcant at p s 0.05 
b Signlflcant at p s 0.10 
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Model3 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
2.9088 
0.2697 
0.1227 
0.1182 
0.9327 
0.8541 
-0.0008
0.0739
0.1365 
0.9920 
-0.0283
0.8211
0.0232 
0.0019 
6.093 
(p= 0.4128) 
82.31% 
Taltle 8 
Panel B - BelJllta of Lollftlc ...,._ 1985::1987 111 • 814) 
Mode14 Mode15 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
variable relation Wald stat. Wald stat. 
Constant ? -0.2076 -1.0311
0.0290 1.8601b
OCMC{l) + 0.0723 0.1002 
0.0416 0.0792 
LnDEBT 0.0546 0.1092 
0.0092 0.0363 
LnSIZE(l) + -0.1835
1.6829b
LnS1ZE(2) + -0.0967 
1.1974 
SqS1ZE(3) + 
LnPRESS + 0.3755 0.2928 
3.8693a 3.5727a 
PERF(2) + -0.6732 -0.6460
4.2827a 3.8105a
OSEAS + 0.2129 0.1703 
0.1536 0.0997 
Model x.2 8.688 8.166 
(p= 0.1919) (p=0.2262) 
% correctly classtfted 81.88% 81.88% 
a Significant at p s 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10 
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Mode16 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
-1.6146
3.6445a
0.0620 
0.0304 
0.0181 
0.0009 
-0.0002
0.0045
0.1958 
2.1852b 
-0.7226
4.9001a
0.0563 
0.0109 
6.988 
(p=0.3220) 
81.88% 
Table& 
Panel C - Benltl o(Lollftlc Bcll'.CIIJon; lHl::1987 (N• 114) 
Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient 
variable relation Wald stat. Wald stat. 
Constant ? 7.4598 5.9309 
0.4565 0.3177 
OCMC(2) + -0.0196 -0.0J.92
2.7422a 2.6388a 
LnDEBT 1.0304 0.9175 
0.9904 0.8132 
LnSIZE(l) + -0.2572
2.8229a
LnSIZE(2) + -0.1203 
1.5193 
SqSIZE(3) + 
LnPRESS + 0.4423 0.3155 
4.8839a 3.7191a 
SqPERF(l) + -0.0413 -0.0393
0.4568 0.4491
OSEAS + 0.1333 0.0585 
0.0576 0.0112 
Model x2 12.518 11.113 
(p= 0.0514) (p= 0.0850) 
% correctly classified 81.98% 81.98% 
a Significant at p s 0.05 
b Slgntftcant at p s 0.10 
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Model9 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
3.9205 
0.2577 
-0.0206
3.0453a 
0.6109 
0.3615 
-3.4E-05
0.0002
0.2071 
2.1180b 
-0.0325
0.5647
-0.1249
0.0531
9.612 
(p= 0.1420) 
81.98% 
Table 8 
Panel D · BelJlltA of LoJlltlc BeaelllPA; 1985-1987 fN • S14l 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Independent Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
variable relation Wald stat. Wald stat. Wald stat. 
Constant ? 0.1550 -0.7107 -1.3623
0.0151 0.7360 2.5352b 
OCMC(2) + -0.0194 -0.0192 -0.0201
2.7514a 2.6978a 2.9262a 
LnDEBT -0.1316 -0.0991 -0.1667
0.0498 0.0270 0.0683
LnSIZE(l ) + -0.1759
1.5114b
LnS1ZE{2) + -0.0798 
0.7617 
SqS1ZE(3) + 0.0005 
0.0362 
LnPRESS + 0.4388 0.3455 0.2565 
4.9971a 4.5860a 3.4677a 
PERF(2) + -0.7117 -0.7010 -0.7687
4.6399a 4.3904a 5.3449a
OSEAS + 0.0973 0.0422 -0.0788
0.0311 0.0059 0.0208
Model x2 12.672 11.900 11.184 
(p= 0.0485) (p = 0.0642) (p= 0.0829) 
% correctly classified 81.53% 81.53% 81.53% 
a Significant at p S 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10
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Closer analysis of the results of sub-I and sub-2 provides additional evidence 
supporting the above mentioned inference. All coefficients 1n sub-I yield directions 
consistent with Model 10. However, where OCMC(2) is significant 1n Model 10, it is not 
signtftcant 1n sub-I. With regard to the result of sub-2, the direction of all coefficients 
except that LnDEBT, are consistent with those of Model 8. But, where OCMC{2) and 
SqPERF(l) are significant 1n Model 10. they are not significant 1n sub-2. Thus, analysis 
of individual coefficient and its significance level reveals that the split-sample validation 
process support the validity of Model I 0. 
In terms of the predictive efficacy, estimation of PREcv yields evtdence suggesting 
that Model I O is an efficacious model. When compared with the result of sub- I and sub-
2, the estimated PREcv is 41.72%% and 44.60% respectively. Thus, it is inferred that the 
prediction error 1s reduced by about one half when using Model 10 to predict whether a 
lessee firm will capitalize Its finance lease commitments. In conclusion, based on the 
evidence derived from the split-sample validation process and the estimation of PREcv, 
Model 10 is a valid, generalisable and efficacious model. 
Summary 
It is apparent that the result of the pooled cross-sectional analysis provides 
strong evidence to accept only one of the six research hypotheses. Whilst the lack of 
explanatory power could be attributed to the theoretical framework. or the research 
methodology adopted or both. there are perhaps other factors that could have 
confounded the result. These factors include significant accounting events; that is. the 
Issuance and introduction of new accounting standards that have the potential to 
affect lessee firms' accounting policy choices and also their profitability and financial 
structure. 
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Table? 
but Semple YIUdatlon of Loldltic BeOCHlon Bftlmatlon: 1911:1987 
Independent 
variable 
Constant 
OCMC(2) 
LnDEBT 
LnSIZE(2) 
LnPRESS 
SqPERF(l) 
OSEAS 
Model .,_2 
% correctly classified 
a Slgnitlcant at p s 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10 
Expected 
relation 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Model 10 
(N= 314) 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
0.1550 
0.0151 
-0.0194
2.7514a
-0.!316
0.0499
-0.1759
1.5114b
0.4388 
4.9971a 
-0.7117
4.6389a
0.0973 
0.0311 
12.672 
(p= 0.0485) 
81.53% 
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Sub-I 
(n= 155) 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
1.1529 
0.3431 
-0.0193
1.2750
-0.8542
0.6669
-0.2378
1. 1036
0.5267 
3.1075a 
-1.1899
5.5020a
0.5350 
0.3415 
11.521 
(p= 0.0735) 
82.27% 
Sub-2 
(n= 159) 
Coefficient 
Wald stat. 
-0.5545
0.1062 
-0.0105
0.3939
1.5972 
1.3998 
-0.1884
0.9448
0.3510 
1.8405b 
-0.3937
0.7405
0.0499 
0.0049 
5.171 
(p= 0.5221) 
80.82% 
In 1985, the accounting standard AAS 18 Accounting for Goodwill (AARF, ASB, 
1985) was Issued. Furthermore, In 1986, AAS 19 Accounting for Joint Ventures (AARF, 
ASB, 1986a), and AAS 20 Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation (AARF, ASB, 
1986b) promulgated. Finally. in 1987, the ASRB approved the adoption of ASRB 1011 
Accounting for Research and Development (R&D) Costs (ASRB, 1987). These accounting 
standards limit the options for firms to account for goodwill, Joint venture transactions, 
foreign subsidiaries financial statements, and R&D costs respectively. As a result. these 
events influenced finns' accounting policy choices and also their profitability and 
financial structures. 42 
Another factor that could have confounded the result relates to the significance 
of finance lease arrangement for lessee firms that chose to capitalize them. Appendix D 
reveals that on average. throughout 1985-1987 capitalized leased assets and capitalized 
lease liabilities only represented less than three percent of capitalizers' total assets and 
total liabilities respectively. This is further supported by a finding that in 1988 (the first 
year the requirements of AAS 17 became mandatory}. on average the capitalized lea.sed 
assets and capitalized lease liabilities represented about three per cent of capitalizers· 
total assets and five per cent of capitalizers' total liabilities respectively. 43 This 
preliminary evidence suggests that finance lease accounting policy was not a major 
agenda in terms of policy choices and its effect on the lessee firms' profitability and 
financial structure. This finding also leads to the inference that for the non-capitalizers, 
their finance lease commitments may even be less significant than those of the 
capitalizers, and consequently adopted the footnote disclosure accounting policy based 
on the arguments that it is an adequate form of reporting (Abdel-khalik et al., 198 la; 
Bowman, 1980; Finnerty et al., 1980: Houghton, 1984: Lawrence & Bear, 1986; Murray, 
1982, Narayanaswamy. 1994; Wilkins & Zimmer, 1983a). 
42 
43 
This explanation suggests and re-affirms that a firm has a portfolio of accounting 
policies at its disposal (Zmijewski & Hagerman, 1981). 
A random sample of 37 lessee firms In 1988 were selected of which about 60% of them 
had finance lease commitments. They complied With the capitalization requirement of 
MS 17. 
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Notwithstanding the preceding 11mttations and plausible confounding factors, 
the logistic regression model 10 has been found to be a valid, generalisable beyond the 
sample, and efficacious model. 
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Summary 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study is to answer the research question of: Why a group of 
lessee firms chose to capitalize whilst others chose to report via footnote disclosure their 
respective finance lease commitments during the transitional or phase-in period (1985 
1987) as permitted by MS 17. Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the history and the 
features of MS 17. with particular attention on the transitional provision and the 
finance lease accounting choice. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the 
capitalization debate supported by empirical evidence. 
Chapter 3 deals With the review of the selected similar published studies of 
accounting policy choice. The purpose of this review is to identify areas of improvement 
that could be incorporated into this study. These improvements are elaborated in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
As a subsequent chapter, Chapter 4 relates to the discussion on the theory 
development and hypotheses formulation. A combined theory of contracting theory 
(efficient contracting perspective) and signalling theory has been employed as the 
underlying theoretical framework. From this framework a general hypothesis was 
formulated, that is, lessee firms choose to capitalize finance lease rather than adopt 
footnote disclosure in order to reduce or mitigate the agency costs and/or political costs 
and also to signal to t'1e market that they are high quality firms, which consequently 
would lead to maximizing the value of the firm. To test this general hypothesis. six 
research hypotheses were formulated and proxted by six constructs as explanatory 
variables. These variables are: Corporate structure, debt contracting, firm size, political 
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visibility, financial performance, and overseas association. The dependent variable is the 
finance lease accounting choice: Capitalization or footnote disclosure. 
In Chapter 5, the sample selection process was discussed and followed by the 
definitions of the dependent and independent variables. Ulis chapter also describes the 
data that were collected for each year of 1985, 1986 and 1987 from various sources 
which include the AGSM Annual Reports Microfiche File, the publications by the Stock 
Exchange Research Pty Ltd (Stock Exchange Research Pty Ltd, 1986, 1987 & 1988), 
Jobson's Public Company (and Mining) Year Book (Dunn & Bradstreet, 1986, 1987 & 
1988), and the Australian Business Index (Australian Business Intelligence, 1986, 1987 
& 1988). Finally the research design aspects of this study was discussed in this chapter. 
It was considered appropriate to employ a multivariate analysis, in particular the logistic 
regression, to test the data for pooled cross-sectional analysis. 
Chapters 6 presents the results of the statistical analyses undertaken in this 
study. The results discussed in these chapters Include the descriptive statistics. 
regression diagnostics. logistic regression with sensitivity analysis. and regression model 
validation process. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to examine the economic factors motivating 
Australian listed lessee companies to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their 
finance lease commitments throughout 1985 to 1987. as permitted by the transitional 
provision of the accounting standard AAS 17: Accounting for Leases. It is hypothesised 
that the decision to capitalize, rather than to disclose finance lease commitments in the 
footnotes of the financial statements, Is positively related to a firm's (1) corporate 
structure, (2) debt contract financial constraints, (3) size, (4) political visibility, (5) 
financial performance, and (6) overseas association. 
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Pooled croa.-.ectloml ana1yala 
The result reveals that only hypothesis H4 ts supported. Thus, on average for the 
transitional period, the capitalization decision was positively related to lessee firm's 
political visibility as measured by the level of press coverage. It can also be inferred that 
capitalization may be used by lessee firms as a means of reducing wealth transfers 
related to the political process and also as a signal to the market that they are high 
quality firms. The result also indicates findings that are contrary to expectation. It is 
found that capitalization decision was negatively related to firm's ownership structure, 
size, and financial performance: of which only size Is not significant. This perplex finding 
could be explained by alternative plausible hypotheses. 
Alternative plausible hypotheses 
Notwithstanding the findings of this study, there are perhaps other plausible 
explanations motivating a firm to capitalize rather than disclosing its finance lease 
commitments in the footnotes of the financial statement during the transitional period. 
1\vo plausible hypotheses are offered. 
First, firms that capitalized their finance lease commitments prior to the 
mandatory compliance date of AAS 17 had a different set of motives other than those 
suggested in this study. There is evidence in the literature suggesting that early adopters 
of accounting standards. as in the case of the capitalizers in this study, time their 
adoption with the view to "earnings management" (Ali & Kumar, 1993; Gujarathi & 
Hoskin. 1992: Pincus & Wasley. 1994). 
Second, the research question may perhaps be better explained by adopting a 
socio-economic paradigm rather than an economic paradigm of economic consequences 
theory used in this study (Mangos & Lewis, 1995; Neu, 1992). This socio-economic 
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paradigm suggests the Inclusion of social factors In the analysis because managers, 
being .. economic actors are Influenced by their environment and also have the ability to 
Influence that environment" (Mangos & Lewis, 1995 p. 56). 
Umltationa of the •tudy 
Whilst every effort has been taken to ensure that this is a thorough and rigorous 
study, there are inherent limitations in it. As this study is an example of positive 
accounting research, it suffers from the limitations that have been well documented and 
expounded by Holthausen (1990), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983). and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990). Among others, these limitations include specification errors in either 
the left-hand side (dependent) variable. or the right-hand side {independent) variables or 
both (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983: Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). With respect to the 
specification error of the left-hand side variable, it was inherently assumed in this study 
that firms use single capitalization of finance lease commitments policy to reduce or 
mitigate agency costs ant ,Jolitical costs and to signal to the market. However. there is 
evidence to indicate that firms use a portfolio of accounting procedures and policies 
rather than single accounting policy (Zmijewski & Hagerman. 1981). This study also 
acknowledges the possible specification error of the right-hand side variables relating to 
the imprecise measurement constructs of the proxy variables used as independent 
variables in this study (Holthausen & Leftwich. 1983; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
Another potential limitation of this study is that the practices relating to 
accounting treatment of finance lease commitments in the year of issuance of AAS 17 
and during the period of exposure draft ED 17 were not examined. During this period, 
some lessee firms may have already capitalized finance leases in anticipation of AAS 17 
(Godfrey & Warren, forthcoming). This is possible because about half of the resJ>l)ndents 
to ED 17 supported the capitalization policy (Roberts, 1982). Thus, the practices of 
lessee firms during this period may confound the analysis of this study. 
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Apart from the preceding limitations, further shortcomings of this study are the 
very modest explanatory power and the lack of explanations for findings that are 
contrary to expectations. As noted by Bazley et al., (1985) that "the results here [as tn 
the case of this study) have confirmed the difficulty we have in explaining discretionary 
accounting policy choice. This 'relatively modest' explanatory power ... is not unique to 
this study" (p. 61). Other accounting policy studies which exhibit modest explanatory 
power include the studies by Brown. lzan, and Loh (1992), Whittred and Chan (1992), 
and Wilkins and Mok (1991). 
Impllcatlons of this study 
The findings of this study provide the following implications, even though only 
one of the research hypotheses was supported by the result. First. the variable level of 
press coverage has been found to be an important predictor and proxy for firm's political 
visibility. This is a significant finding because it Is an evidence that firms will act 
efficiently in responding to the media's perception of their level of political visibility, and 
at the same time signalling that they are not endeavouring to mislead the market by 
adopting an accounting policy that is both income reducing / deferral in principle and 
purporting to show the economic substance of finance lease commitments. 
Second, whilst the standard setters may believe that a lengthy transitional 
period is useful to the lessee firms and users of financial statements, the evidence of this 
study suggests otherwise. This is because at the end of 1987 only about 21 % of the total 
sampled lessee firms (67 out of 314 firms) that had finance lease commitments opted to 
capitalize early. Furthennore, in Appendix D, there is primafacie evidence that among 
the capitalizers the level of average capitalized leased assets had reduced from 1985 to 
1987. This suggests that lessee firms had during the period not only re-negotiated the 
existing finance lease agreements but possibly re-negotiated with the lessors to make the 
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existing finance lease commibnents appear as an operating lease and thus not brought 
into account (Abdel-khalik, 1981; Godfrey & Warren, forthcoming; Whittred & Zimmer, 
1992). This form of reaction by the lessee ts contrary to the spirit of the standard, which 
did not intend to encourage lessees to circumvent the provisions of AAS 1,· but to allow 
lessees the opportunity "to gain experience in presenting .. . information relating to 
leases .. {para. 34). Therefore. it is plausible to hypothesise that multi-year adoption 
period is a political rather than an economic arrangement {Langer & Lev, 1993) which 
gave firms the opportunity to manipulate income (Pincus & Wasley, 1994; Soo, 1991). 
The implication of the findings of this study to the users of financial statements 
is not to support any proposal to have a lengthy phase-in period in future accounting 
standards. This is because during this period, as in this case, the transitional period of 
AAS 17, the financial statements of lessee firms were incomparable due to different 
finance lease accounting policies adopted by the lessees, that is capitalized or expensed. 
There are costs, private and social, resulting from a reduction in cross-company (lessee) 
comparability (Langer & Lev, 1993). Since different lessee firms used different finance 
lease accounting policy, it complicates "the cross-sectional adjustment of financial 
statements to a uniform basis" (Langer & Lev. 1993 p. 516). 
Suggested areas for future research 
One area for future research is to test the hypothesis of income smoothing by the 
capitalizers. It is an empirical question whether or not the capitalizers took the 
opportunity of voluntary early adoption for income smoothing purposes. The findings of 
this study would help, among others. the standard setters to either continue or cease 
the policy of providing a lengthy phase-in period for new accounting policy requirements. 
At present, these phase-in provisions are provided so as to give the financial statements 
preparers ample time and opportunity to grasp and understand the requirements of the 
accounting standards. However, if by this proposed study it is found that firms took this 
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advantage for income smoothing or bath effect purposes, then arguably the reasons for 
having such lengthy phase-in periods as offered by the standard setters are indeed 
unjustttled. (Langer & Lev, 1993; Pincus & Wasley, 1994). 
Another area for future research is to extend the application of the joint 
contracting/ signalling framework in examining the economic factors motivating lessee 
firms' choice to either adopt early or defer the adoption of the requirement to capitalize 
their finance lease within the phase-in period. Findings of similar studies in the 
literature indicate that besides certain economic factors like firm size and leverage, the 
financial statements effect of adoption is a significant factor influencing a firm's 
accounting policy adoption timing choice. These studies include the studies by Ayres 
(1986}, Trombley (1989). Scott (1991). Ali and Kumar (1994). and Tung and Weygandt 
(1994). As no similar studies have been done in the Australian environment. this area of 
future research represents an opportunity to understand the motivations and 
behaviours of Australian firms. Furthermore. it also represents an opportunity to extend 
the generalisaoility of the methodologies and the findings of studies done in the USA 
environment. 
Finally this study could be replicated In other countries especially in countries 
that developed their accounting standards based on the one formulated by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This Is because, the equivalent 
IASC standard on lease accounting, IAS 17: Accounting for Leases (IASC, 1982). also 
has a lengthy transitional or phase-in period. The findings of such studies would 
enhance understanding on cross-cultural behaviours of managers in accounting policy 
choices (Hofstede, 1983 & 1984}. 
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AppendlxA 
Dam Collected From AGSM rue and Other Source, 
( 1) Lessee's name
(2) Industry category
(3) Net profit (a) current year; (b) plior year
(4) Tax expense: {a} current year: (b) plior year
(5) Interest expense: (a) current year: (b) prior year
(6) Extraordinary items: (a) current year; (b) prior year
(7) Finance lease charges
(8) Total revenues
(9) Total tangible assets
{ I 0) Total assets: (a) current year: (b) prior year
(11) Total liabilities: {a) current year: (b) prior year
(12) Shareholders· funds: (a) current year: (b) prtor year
( 13) Current lease commitments
(14) Financial/ capital leased assets
(15) Total lease liabilities
{ 16) Amortisation of leased assets
( 19) Percentage of ordinary shares held by top 20 shareholders
(20) Foreign parent company
(21) Overseas exchange listing status
(22) Press coverage
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.appendb:B 
AuttuJl•n Apoclated Stock ksb101e (AASE) Indqatry C]gdflc,tlon 
{1985 - 1987) 
Automotive 
Banks 
Builders and Suppliers 
Chemicals 
Developers and Contractors 
Diversified Resources 
Elecf:Iical and Durables 
Entrepreneurtal Investors 
Finance 
Food Sectors 
He,,.vy Engineering 
Insurance 
Investment and Trustees 
Light Engineering 
Media 
Metals 
Merchants and Agents 
Miscellaneous and Diversified Industrials 
Miscellaneous Services 
Oil and Gas 
Paper and Packaging 
Property Trusts 
Retail 
Solid Fuels 
Textiles 
Transport 
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The financial charactertstlcs of the capitalizers and the non-capitalizers have to be 
comparable before any between groups statistical testtngs can be performed. This can be 
achieved in either one of the following way: (1) to adjust the non- capitalizers' financial 
vartables as if they had capitalized their finance lease commitments (or constructive 
capitalization); (2) to adjust the capitalizers' financial variables as if they had 
periodically expensed, rather than capitalized, their finance lease commitments. 
However, since the former is not feasible due to unavailability of information to reliably 
estimate the implicit interest rates, finance lease charges. present value of obUgations, 
fair values, and amortisation expense, the latter method of adjustment was opted. This 
is because AAS 17 (para. 57) requires the capitalizers to disclose additional information 
that enable the necessary adjustments to be made. 
Table Cl 
A4Justments to Remove the Effect of Capitall�ation of the Capitalizer Group's 
Financial Variables 
Financial variables 
Total liabilities 
Total tangible assets 
Total assets 
Adoption year net income 
Adjustments 
Total liabilities (less) total capitalized lease liabilities 
Total tangible assets (less) total capitalized leased assets 
Total assets (less) total capitalized leased assets 
Adoption year net income before extraordinary items 
(add) adoption year finance lease charges (add) adoption 
year amortisation of finance leases (less) estimated lease 
commitment due not later than one year 
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Appendb:D
Table Dl 
Panel A; Prqportlon of Mean CaplteJIR4 Leud..Auets to Mean Total Auet· 
($'OOO}; CQlteJIRJ lrOJI», 
Year 
1!)85 
1986 
1987 
1985-1987 
Leased assets 
11395.892 
14329.800 
3851.412 
9850.313 
Total assets 
532817.243 
226493.100 
328670.941 
430039.750 
Proportion (%)
2.138 
6.326 
1.171 
2.290 
Panel B; Proportion of Mean CQitallzed Lease LlabWtles to Mean Total Liabllltles• 
($'000) ; CApitallzer o:oup. 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1985-1987 
Lease liabilities 
8429.158 
14040.000 
3139.263 
7766.478 
Total liabilities 
258235.474 
140973.300 
167504.105 
215003.866 
Proportion (%)
3.264 
9.959 
l.874
3.612 
Panel C; PJ:cmortlon of Mean Ca,pltallzed Leased Assets C& Mean Ca,plteJlzed Lease 
Liabilltlesl to Mean Total Assets (Mean Total LiabWtiesl• ($'OOO); 1988 
Year Leased assets Total assets 
1988 22116.318 755440.682 
Year Lease Liabilities Total liabilities 
1988 20969.864 414620.727 
• Mjusted for capita.Uzatloa of finance leases (see Appendix C)
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Proportion (%) 
2.927 
Proportion (%)
5.057 
AppendlxE 
List of Companies iD the Sample 
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Non-captt•Jlun (footnote cUaclQsew 
- 1986
ACI International Ltd 
Acrow Australia Ltd 
Adelaide & Wallaroo Fertilizers Ltd 
.t\FL Holdings Ltd 
AFM Developments Ltd 
Amalgamated Holdings Ltd 
Amalgank'1.ted Wireless Ltd 
Amatil Ltd 
Ampol Ltd 
Angus & Coote Holdings Ltd 
APM Ltd 
Amotts Ltd 
Atkin Carlyle Ltd 
ATS Resources Ltd 
Austen & Butta Ltd 
Austral Group Ltd 
Asiatii; Pacific Resources Ltd 
Austmark International Ltd 
Australian Chemical Holdings Ltd 
Australian Consolidated Mineral Ltd 
Australian Merchant Holdings Ltd 
Australian National Industries Ltd 
Bank of Queen5land Ltd 
Barrack Mines Ltd 
Bennet & Fisher Ltd 
Blue Circle Ltd 
Boral Ltd 
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Brash Holdings Ltd 
Bridgestone Australia Ltd 
Broadlands Finance Ltd 
Bruck Australia Ltd 
BTR Nylex Ltd 
Bunntngs Ltd 
Caltex Australia Ltd 
Cameronic Technology Corporation Ltd 
C«11ada Northeast Australia OU NL 
Carpenters Investment Trading Ltd 
Carr Boyd Mineral Ltd 
Carrier Air Conditioning Holdings Ltd 
Cascade Brewery Company Ltd 
C & C Bottlers Ltd 
Chalmers Ltd 
Chamberlain Holdings Ltd 
Cheetham Ltd 
Clyde lndustr.es Ltd 
Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd 
Communications & Entertainment Ltd 
Comsteel Vickers Ltd 
Consolidated Rutile Ltd 
Costain Ltd 
G E Crane Holdings Ltd 
Cudgen RZ Ltd 
Cultus Pacific Ltd 
Davies Brothers Ltd 
Defiance Mills Ltd 
Dominion Mining & OU NL 
Dunlop Olympic Ltd 
Eagle Corporation 
East African Coffee Plantations Ltd 
Edward Dunlop & Co. Ltd 
Elders IXL Ltd 
Elders Resources Ltd 
Enacon Ltd 
Energy Resources Ltd 
ENI'Ltd 
Entrad Corporation Ltd 
Evans Deakin Industries Ltd 
Fairfax (John) Ltd 
Faulding {FH) & Co. Ltd 
Fielder Gillespie DaVies Ltd 
Gene Link Limited 
General Investment Australia Ltd 
Gibson Chemical Industries Ltd 
Goliath Cement Holding::; Ltd 
Gordon & Gootch Limited 
Greenbushes Tin Ltd 
Griffiths Brothers Ltd 
Group Property SerVices Ltd 
Hanirnex Corporation Ltd 
Hardie (James) Ltd 
Hawker De Havtlland Ltd 
Henderson's Industries Ltd 
Henry & Walker Ltd 
Herald & Weekly Tunes Ltd 
Hill Minerals 
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Hills Industries Ltd 
Holland (John) Holdings Ltd 
Home Energy Group 
Humes Ltd 
Hunter Resources Ltd 
ICI Australia Ltd 
Industrial Equity Ltd 
Industrial & Pastoral Holdings Ltd 
lntemaUonal Combustion Australia Ltd 
Ivanhoe 
Jasco Holdings Ltd 
Jingellic Minerals Ltd 
Johns Perry Ltd 
Jones (DaVid) Ltd 
Jonray 
Kemtron Ltd 
Keywest Investments Ltd 
Kia Or-:t Gold Corporation NL 
Kilndried Timber lndustrit!s Ltd 
Kurts (Peter) Properties Ltd 
Lanes Motor Holdings Ltd 
Ludowici & Sons Ltd 
MacBesser Ltd 
Mcilwraith McEacharn Ltd 
Mayne Nickless Ltd 
Metals Exploration Co. 
Metro Industries Ltd 
Mildara Wines Ltd 
MIM Holdings Ltd
Mitsubls'. u Motors Australia Ltd 
Monier Ltd 
Moonie Oil Co. Ltd 
Moore Business Systems Aust. Ltd 
Mortlock Brothers Ltd 
Muswellbrook Energy & Minerals Ltd 
Myer Emporium Ltd 
Nally Ltd 
National Consolidated Ltd 
National 1iustee Exec. & Agency Co. 
News Corp. Ltd 
Nicholas KiWi Australasia Ltd 
Nilsen Australia Ltd 
North Broken Hills Ltd 
Oakbrtdge Ltd
Oceanic Equity Ltd 
Offshore Oil NL 
P & 0 Australia Ltd
Pancontinental Petroleum Ltd 
Paynter Dixon Holdings Ltd 
Peko-Wallsend Ltd
Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 
Peters (WA) Ltd 
Petersville Sleigh Ltd 
Phillps Industries Ltd 
Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd 
Plumrose Australia Ltd 
Poseldon Ltd 
Qintex Ltd 
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QUF Industries Ltd 
Renison Goldftelds Consolidated Ltd 
Repco Corporation 
Richardson (D) & Sons Ltd 
Rovers Holdings Ltd 
SA BreWing Holdings Ltd 
Sabco Ltd 
Santos Ltd 
Siddons Industries Ltd 
Simpson Holdings Ltd 
Smith (Howard) Ltd 
Softwood Holdings Ltd 
Shannons Ltd 
Southern Farmers Group Ltd 
Speedo Holdings Ltd 
Spotless Group Ltd 
Sunshin� Australia Ltd 
Syme (David) & Co. Ltd 
Taubmans Industries Ltd 
Thomas & Coffey Ltd 
Thorn EMI Australia Ltd 
Tooth & Co. t.td 
Tt;bemakers of Australia Ltd 
T\:VT Ltd 
Union Carbide Aust. & New Zealand Ltd 
Unity Corporation Ltd 
Universal Telecasters Ltd 
Varn Ltd 
Vox Adeon Holdings Ltd 
Walton Bonds Ltd 
Watt (James) Group J td 
Waugh & Josephson Holdings Ltd 
Webster Ltd 
Westfield Holdings Ltd 
Westinghouse Brake & Signal Co. 
{Australia) Ltd 
Westralian Forest Industries Ltd 
Whittakers Ltd 
Winterbottom Ltd 
Woodside Petroleum 
Wonnald International Ltd 
Wright (Walter) lndustrtes Ltd 
York Motor Holdings Ltd 
Non-capitall;;ers (footnote disclosers) 
- 198�
Amcor Ltd 
Ariadne Austr..ilia Ltd 
Bell Ltd 
Bisley Investment Corporation Ltd 
Brambles Industries Ltd 
Brick & Pipe Industries Ltd 
BT Insurance Ltd 
Bundaberg Sugar Co. Ltd 
Bums Philips & Co. Ltd 
BWD Industries Ltd 
carrlcks Ltd 
Cereus Australia Ud 
\06 
Comalco Ltd 
CRALtd 
Davis {Charles) Ltd 
Golconds. Minerals 
Golden Grove 
Goodman Ltd 
Gunns Kilnd Ltd 
Hancock & Gore Ltd 
Horwood Bagshaw Ltd 
Mcconnel Dowell Ltd 
Mt. Carrtgnton Mines 
National Venture Ltd 
Netmap Corporation Ltd 
PAL Ltd 
Pacific Dunlop Ltd 
Petro Energy 
Pine Vale 
Pioneer Sugar Ltd 
Provincial Newspapers Ltd 
Rothwells Ltd 
Smith (Henry) Ltd 
Stokes Australasia Ltd 
Strategic Minerals 
Viscount Holdings Ltd 
Wattyl Ltd 
WCPLtd 
Weston {George) Foods Ltd 
Woolworths Ltd 
Non-caplteJIBD (footnote 411eto,enl 
· 1987
Advertiser Newspapers Ltd 
Associated Broadcasting Services Ltd 
Clayton Roband Ltd 
Coles Myer Ltd 
Compute.r Power Ltd 
Comrealty Ltd 
Danomic Investment Ltd 
Euro-national Ltd 
First Investors Security Ltd 
Gaza.I Corporation Ltd 
Ghvan Ltd 
Golden Shamrock 
Gordon Pacific 
ICAL Ltd 
McOonnel & East Ltd 
National Properties Ltd 
Normandy Resources 
Pan Australian Mini?1g 
Reid (Malcolm) Ltd 
Rothmans Holdings Ltd 
TNT Ltd 
White (Joe) 
Capitalizers - 1985 
Allied Queensland Coalfields Ltd 
Ashton 
Austram Ltd 
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Base Resources Ltd 
Bond Corporation Ltd 
Brtstile Ltd 
BHP Ltd 
Cherry Lane Fashion Group Ltd 
City & Suburban Properties Ltd 
Coal & Allied Industries Ltd 
Coventr:· Motor Replacements Ltd 
Crusader Oil NL 
CSR Ltd 
Eglo Engineering Services Ltd 
Endeavour Resources Ltd 
Energy Research Group Ltd 
�WI Ltd 
Hartogen 
Hiteks Ltd 
IDAPS Australia Ltd 
Leighton Holdings Ltd 
Linter Groups Ltd 
Malco Industries Ltd 
McKay (Ralph) 
Minerals. Mining & Metallurgy Ltd 
Osborne Metals Ltd 
Pacific Cooper Ltd 
Pancontinental Mining Ltd 
Parry Corporation Ltd 
Pelsart Resources NL 
Pennant Holdings Ltd 
Reckitt & Coleman Australla Ltd 
Reid (Walter} & Co. Ltd 
Shearer (John} Ltd 
Timber Holdings Ltd 
Tinsley Corporatlr Ltd 
Wesfarmers Ltd 
White Industries Ltd 
CUltaUzers - 1986 
APA Holdings Ltd 
Australia Gas Light Co. Ltd 
Australian Mining Investment 
Eastern Resources Ltd 
GKN Kwikform Ltd 
Hastings Deering Ltd 
Mangrovfte Industries Ltd 
Newtech Development Corporation Ltd 
Queensland Cement & Lime Co. Ltd 
Queensla.,d Press Ltd 
Capitalizers - 1987 
Alcan Ltd 
Australian Resort 
Bond Media Ltd 
Bridge Oil Ltd 
Cadbury Schweppes Ltd 
Coal & Carbon 
Colly Farms Cotton Ltd 
Giant Resources 
Income Group Ltd 
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Kem Corporation Ltd 
Macmahon Holdings Ltd 
Meridian Oil NL 
Metals Manufacturing Ltd 
Natcorp Investments 
Palmer Tube Ltd 
Petroz 
Segenhoe Ltd 
SA Gas Ltd 
Total Assets Ltd 
